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This thesis analyzes Pakistan’s Kashmir policy and strategy since 1947.  Pakistan 
has sought to obtain the accession of Kashmir for over fifty years.  This policy has its 
origins in Pakistan’s struggle for a separate state for South Asia’s Muslims, its belief that 
India never accepted Pakistan’s existence, and Pakistan’s domestic cleavages and 
institutional weaknesses.  Because these beliefs and characteristics remain today, 
Pakistan is unlikely to drop its claim to Kashmir.  Pakistan’s strategy to achieve its 
objectives has included diplomacy, war, and proxy war.  This thesis explores how 
internal and external variables have impacted Pakistan’s methods and what this means for 
the current effort to end the proxy war in Kashmir.  Although Pakistan is unlikely to 
abandon its claims to Kashmir, an analysis of Pakistan’s shift from diplomacy to war in 
1965 and from diplomacy to proxy war in 1990 demonstrates that Pakistan’s strategy 
responds to external constraints and opportunities.   The United States may not be able to 
end the dispute over Kashmir by pressuring Pakistan to drop its claims, but Washington 
retains sufficient influence to persuade Pakistan to use a peaceful strategy to pursue its 
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I.  INTRODUCTION  
A. A SHIFT IN STRATEGY?  
The dispute over Kashmir has been the root cause of two of the three wars India 
and Pakistan have fought since gaining their independence in August 1947.  The origin of 
the conflict lies in the partition of the Indian subcontinent and each nation’s struggle for 
identity.  Since Kashmir’s population was seventy percent Muslim, Pakistan believed that 
it was rightfully part of the state that was founded as the homeland for South Asia’s 
Muslims.  India, on the other hand, claimed to be a secular democracy and sought control 
over Kashmir to prove its secular credentials.  Because India’s leaders had fought 
vehemently against the idea of two nations in South Asia, Pakistan’s leaders believed 
India’s purpose in Kashmir was to disprove the two-nation theory, while simultaneously 
weakening Pakistan so that it would collapse and return into the fold.  Kashmir’s 
implications for the ideological foundations of each state have made both sides unwilling 
to compromise.  During the last fourteen years, the gap between them only seemed to 
widen as India battled an insurgency in Kashmir that it asserts originates from, and is 
directed by, Pakistan. 
In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks against the United States on 11 September 
2001, India has sought to end Pakistan’s proxy war in Kashmir by taking advantage of 
the atmosphere created by the U.S. war on terrorism.  After a terrorist assault against the 
Indian Parliament in December 2001, India mobilized over five hundred thousand troops 
along its border with Pakistan.  War was averted, but India repeated its threats of military 
action again in May 2002 after a terrorist assault on an Indian military camp in Jammu.  
The attack resulted in the death of over thirty people, most were the wives and children of 
military personnel stationed at the camp.  In a speech to Indian troops mobilized along 
the India-Pakistan border after the attack, Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee 
warned Pakistan that if insurgents continued to infiltrate across the Line of Control (LoC) 
into Indian-held Kashmir, there would be a “decisive fight.”1  The Prime Minister 
declared in his press release the following day, “We will not let Pakistan carry on with its 
                                                 
1 “Warships Move as Vajpayee Warns of ‘Decisive Fight,’” Dawn, 23 May 2002, http://www.dawn.com/ 
2002/05/23/top4.htm. 
2 
proxy war against India any longer.”2  Despite Pakistan’s denials that it did not control 
the insurgency, the India gambit paid off when U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald 
Rumsfeld linked the Kashmir struggle to the primary target of the U.S. war on terror 
when he stated that he had “seen indications that there are al Qaeda operating near the 
Line of Control.”3  Even U.S. President George W. Bush, who is reluctant to criticize the 
Pakistani government because of President Pervez Musharraf’s contribution to the U.S. 
war against the Taliban and al Qaeda, said he was, “insisting, along with othe r world 
leaders … that President Musharraf show results in terms of stopping people from 
crossing the Line of Control.”4 
Public acknowledgment by the United States of linkages between the insurgents 
in Kashmir and al Qaeda was an important victory for India because it advanced India’s 
efforts to categorize Pakistan’s activities in Kashmir as state-sponsored terrorism.  
President George Bush’s call on President Musharraf for action implied the validity of 
the Indian argument.  So the question is, can Pakistan actually stop infiltration across the 
Line of Control?  Since capitulation in Kashmir is an untenable position for any Pakistani 
government, must Pakistan continue this proxy war in Kashmir because, as The 
Economist suggested, “to stop would mean surrender?”5  If stopping the infiltration does 
not mean surrender, what should the United States do to encourage Pakistan to use 
peaceful means to seek a solution in Kashmir? 
To answer those questions, this thesis examines the historical evolution of 
Pakistan’s strategy in Kashmir.  Pakistan has attempted to achieve its policy objectives in 
Kashmir using diplomacy, war, and proxy war.  What were the primary reasons for each 
strategy and how has the U.S.-Pakistan relationship influenced Pakistan’s decision-
making toward Kashmir? 
                                                 
2 “Press Statement Issued by Prime Minister Shri Atal Bihari Vajpayee,” 23 May 2002, http://pmindia. 
nic.in.speech/content.asp?id=279. 
3 Quoted in Philip Smucker, “Al Qaeda Thriving in Pakistani Kashmir,” Christian Science Monitor, 2 July 
2002, 1.  Rumsfeld qualified his statement several days later calling the reports indicating this activity 
“speculative.”  See John Lancaster and Karl Vick, “India Mulls Troop Withdrawal; Rumsfeld Backs Off 
Remark About al Qaeda in Kashmir,” Washington Post, 14 June 2002, 20. 
4 Quoted in Paul Watson and Sidhartha Barua, “India Claims Proof of Foe Aiding Rebels,” Los Angeles 
Times, 30 May 2002, A1. 
5 “The Elephant and the Pekinese,” Economist, 16 May 2000, http://www.economist.com/displaystory. 
cfm?story_id=292327. 
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By examining how both internal and external variables have impacted Pakistan’s 
strategy in Kashmir, this thesis makes four conclusions.  First, Pakistan’s Kashmir policy 
is unlikely to change in the near-term because it is inextricably connected to Pakistan’s 
struggle with its national identity, its institutional weaknesses, and five decades of 
hostility with India, which has served to reinforce its suspicions about Indian intentions in 
South Asia.  Second, although Pakistan’s policy has been relatively static, Pakistan’s 
strategy is flexible and has shifted on several occasions.  Pakistan’s strategies have 
ranged from conventional war to diplomacy to proxy war.  Third, Pakistan’s strategy is 
determined by a combination of internal and external factors.  Domestic politics 
contribute heavily to what strategies are pursued.  For instance, the coalition that formed 
between the military and the Islamist parties during the 1980s created a constituency that 
saw the advantages of a proxy war strategy and also benefited from the implementation 
of that strategy.  At the same time, external developments have been crucial to how 
Pakistan pursues it goals in Kashmir.  In fact, changes in the external environment have 
been the key determinants of shifts in Pakistan’s strategy.  Fourth, the status of the U.S.-
Pakistan relationship has had a significant impact on Pakistan’s Kashmir strategy.  The 
major declines in U.S.-Pakistan relations have contributed to Pakistan’s decisions to 
escalate the conflict in Kashmir through either war or proxy war.  Conversely, periods 
characterized by extensive U.S.-Pakistan cooperation correspond to periods in which 
Pakistan largely depended on diplomacy to address the Kashmir issue. 
The United States and India are seeking a major shift in Pakistan’s strategy in 
Kashmir.  Even more, Pakistan is being pressured to abandon a strategy it believes has 
been successful.  In addition to being effective, the strategy to “bleed India” in Kashmir 
is modeled on the strategy employed against the Soviets in Afghanistan, which was 
coordinated with the United States.  A decision to halt assistance to insurgents in 
Kashmir would be a major shift in Pakistan’s strategy and a more nuanced understanding 





B. PAKISTAN’S KASHMIR POLICY AND STRATEGY 
This thesis treats Pakistan’s policy and strategy distinctly.  Policy is defined as a 
stated objective or goal, the desired end state; whereas, strategy is the method utilized to 
achieve the stated policy. There are two reasons this distinction between policy and 
strategy is made.  First, while Pakistan’s policy in Kashmir has been relatively static, 
Pakistan’s strategy has fluctuated.  This difference seems to indicate that the casual 
mechanisms for each are distinctive.  Pakistan’s policy since 1947 has been to seek 
Kashmir’s accession to Pakistan.  The political language used to support this goal is that 
Kashmir is indivisible and Kashmir’s right to self-determination should be fulfilled in 
accordance with the 1948 United Nations Security Resolutions.  To advance this policy, 
Pakistan has negotiated with India, went to war with India, and aided an insurgency 
against India.  The second reason policy and strategy are treated distinctly is that the most 
pressing problem today is ending the proxy war in Kashmir because it could be the 
trigger for the next war between India and Pakistan.  Since Pakistan’s strategy has 
demonstrated significantly more flexibility than its policy, the United States should focus 
its immediate efforts on changing Pakistan’s strategy.   
The framework of this thesis is loosely based on a 1988 essay by Robert Putnam 
that attempted to provide a “framework for understanding how diplomacy and domestic 
politics interact.”6  He argued that a country’s policy, its “win-set” or acceptable solution, 
was determined by:  (1) the distribution of power, preferences, and possible coalitions at 
the domestic level; (2) the nature of political institutions at the domestic level; and (3) the 
strategies chosen by the negotiators.  Putnam’s framework was designed to show how a 
state’s foreign policy is subjected to tensions at both the domestic and international level.  
But, ultimately domestic factors determine a state’s policy because any agreement made 
at the international level must be “ratified” in some form at the domestic level.  Foreign 
policy is conducted at the inter-state level but the formulation of foreign policy is done at 
the domestic level.  The internal politics, ideology, and history of a country determines its 
foreign policy goals even if the external environment is not conducive to their 
achievement.  This framework is particularly useful because it provides a way of 
                                                 
6 Robert D. Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,” International 
Organizations 42 (Summer 1988): 441-52. 
5 
understanding how Pakistan’s policy in Kashmir has survived fifty years of 
disappointment.  It can even be argued that Pakistan’s objectives in Kashmir are against 
its national interests.  Still, internal attributes of Pakistan have made Pakistan’s policy in 
Kashmir quite resilient.  This thesis applies this framework to Pakistan’s policy but it 
focuses on strategy and treats it as a dependent variable, rather than an independent 
variable.  Instead of assuming that strategy is simply chosen by decision-makers, it 
analyzes strategy as a product of the same internal-external interaction that creates a 
country’s policy.  
Pakistan’s strategy has shifted on several occasions and this thesis examines the 
broad shifts in Pakistan’s strategy in Kashmir and analyzes how internal and external 
variables impact the timing of the shifts and the type of strategy Pakistan employs.  It 
looks at the Kashmir dispute as a negotiation in which Pakistan has used strategies 
ranging from diplomatic overtures to war in an effort to achieve its policy aims, and asks 
why certain strategies were employed at certain points.  The results of this analysis are 
optimistic because they indicate that changes in the external environment and Pakistan’s 
relationship with the actors in the external environment have a major impact on 
Pakistan’s strategy.  Most significantly, this study shows that while the United States may 
not be able to get Pakistan to abandon its claims to Kashmir, it can play a crucial role in 
getting it to shift toward a peaceful strategy. 
 
1. Foundations of Pakistan’s Kashmir Policy 
Pakistan’s policy in Kashmir has its origins in the two-nation theory that 
Muhammad Ali Jinnah utilized to convince the British that a separate nation for the 
Muslims of South Asia was necessary in order to protect them and to ensure peace.  
Jinnah’s insistence on two nations, one Hindu and one Muslim, was driven by the belief 
that Muslims would be politically, economically, and socially dominated by Hindus in a 
single state.7  The outbreak of communal violence between Hindus and Muslims during 
the struggle for independence reinforced Jinnah’s claims.  Once the decision was made to 
have two separate states, Jinnah and his Hindu rivals, Jawaharlal Nehru and Mohandas 
                                                 
7 Akbar S. Ahmed, Jinnah, Pakistan, and Islamic Identity: The Search for Saladin (New York: Routledge, 
1997), 80. 
6 
Gandhi, began to jockey for territory.  Pakistan’s leaders believed that Kashmir’s 
territorial contiguity with Pakistan, its economic and political ties with Pakistan, and its 
Muslim majority made its accession to Pakistan a near certainty.  When this did not 
happen, Pakistan’s leaders interpreted Kashmir’s accession to India as evidence of an 
insidious Indian scheme to weaken and eventually eliminate Pakistan. 
Despite having won the battle for a separate state, Muslim concerns over Hindu 
domination persisted.  In a statement to the United Nations Security Council in January 
1948, Pakistan charged, “That India has never wholeheartedly accepted the partition 
scheme and has, since June 1947, been making persistent attempts to undo it.”8  India’s 
use of its military to quash independence bids by the princely states of Hyderabad and 
Junagadh reinforced Pakistani trepidation.  From the Pakistani perspective, India’s 
actions in Kashmir were seen as the most threatening to the survivability of Pakistan and 
the most poignant evidence of the Hindu desire to dominate South Asia.  Therefore, 
Pakistan’s leaders believed it was necessary to challenge Indian rule in Kashmir and 
presented its position on Kashmir as a principled stand in support of Kashmir’s right to 
self-determination against Indian aggression. 
Some observers refuse to accept Pakistan’s position that its policy on Kashmir is 
based on principles of self-determination and instead assert that Pakistan’s obsession with 
Kashmir is a result of a dominant army, which gains enormous advantages by 
maintaining a hostile status quo with India.9  The Pakistan army tries to maintain a hostile 
status quo with India over Kashmir because “[it] doesn’t want to relinquish its position in 
society,” asserts Major General Ashok Krishna, director of the Institute of Peace and 
Conflict in New Delhi during the Kargil conflict.10  More recently, the hostile army 
theory has mutated into an Islamic militant army theory.  On the eve of President Bill 
Clinton’s five-hour visit to Pakistan in March 2000, Selig Harrison declared that 
Clinton’s “trip will strengthen a military regime controlled by Islamic fundamental 
                                                 
8 Pakistan’s Complaint Against India, S/646, 1948, cited in Sisir Gupta, Kashmir: A Study in India-
Pakistan Relations (New York: Asia Publishing House, 1966), 145. 
9 This argument is often found in the U.S. press and supported by Indian military officers and scholars.  
See Pamela Constable, “As Civilian Heads Pursue Peace, Militaries Fuel Kashmir Conflict,” New York 
Times, 30 May 1999, 19.  “Military Hard -Liners Pressure Pakistani Leader,” Wall Street Journal, 27 June 
2002, 15. 
10 Quoted in Pamela Constable, “As Civilian Heads Pursue Peace, Militaries Fuel Kashmir Conflict,” 19. 
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elements who are committed to stirring up trouble with India. […] This is a regime 
dominated by Islamic fundamentalists.  They are not going to let up on Kashmir.”11   
The problem both of these theories have is that they do not account for the near 
unanimous support Pakistan’s policy in Kashmir receives from the population and 
throughout the government.  On the whole, the policies and strategies of Zia ul-Haq and 
Ayub Khan, both generals that assumed the Pakistan’s presidency, do not differ 
substantially from their civilian counterparts in Pakistan and the record of Pakistan’s 
military leaders does not support the argument that Pakistan’s policy is caused by the 
result of an obsessed military.  Both Ayub and Zia sought a settlement in Kashmir mostly 
using diplomacy.  Although the 1965 operation is a rather glaring exception, up to that 
point Ayub had made several attempts to negotiate a resolution to Kashmir with India’s 
Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru.   
Nevertheless, the assertion that Pakistan’s army benefits from the hostility over 
Kashmir is not totally inaccurate; they have.  Furthermore, Pakistan’s policy in Kashmir 
is not based solely on its commitment to Kashmir’s self-determination.  In fact, 
Pakistan’s policy to oppose Indian control of Kashmir was reinforced by several features 
of the state that have provided incentives for various groups to politicize the issue of 
Kashmir and to rally public opinion behind the Kashmiri cause.  Since Pakistan’s 
inception in 1947, ethnic and sectarian cleavages have threatened Pakistan’s unity.  Ayub 
Khan, clearly described the problem in a 1960 Foreign Affairs essay, in which he stated, 
“Till the advent of Pakistan, none of us was in fact a Pakistani.”12  Those that became 
Pakistani were Indians of either Punjabi, Pashtun, Baloch, Sindhi, or Bengali ethnicity.  
Pakistan’s political leaders, many who were Mohajirs, those Muslims that migrated to 
Pakistan from areas that became part of India, could not make appeals for national 
solidarity in terms of an ethnic nation.  In addition to these ethnic divisions, the state’s 
political institutions have been weak and it has been unable to extend its authority 
throughout the country.   
                                                 
11 “Mission to Pakistan,” NewsHour with Jim Lehrer, 24 March 2000, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/ 
asia/jan-june00/pakistan_3-24.html. 
12 Mohammed Ayub Khan, “Pakistan Perspective,” Foreign Affairs 38 (July 1960): 549. 
8 
Pakistan’s leaders had only two options that held broad enough appeal to 
overcome these divisive tendencies.  The first was Islam, which was problematic for the 
secular leaning politicians, bureaucrats, and military officers that occupied the positions 
of power in the new state.  Trained and schooled in British secular ideals, they were leery 
of rallying around an idea that inherently put them at a political disadvantage vis-à-vis the 
Islamic religious authorities.   
The second unifying idea was the threat posed by India.  Pakistani leaders of all 
shades pandered to a public stung by the tragedy of partition and emphasized Kashmir in 
Pakistan’s struggle against the Hindu behemoth.  Pakistan’s first prime minister, Liaquat 
Ali Khan, expressed this sentiment that Kashmir was part of the larger struggle of 
Muslims on the subcontinent against Hindu aggression in a speech in November 1947: 
“Our heart goes out to them—our brethren in this mortal struggle, for the choice before 
them now is freedom or death.  If the plans of their enemies succeed they will be 
exterminated, as Muslims in various other parts of India have been exterminated.”13   
Whether the threat was real or imagined, Pakistan’s Kashmir policy has become 
highly politicized and inflexible because of Kashmir’s implications for Pakistan’s 
national identity and the widespread support the struggle received from the major 
domestic actors.14  Moreover, fifty years of hostile relations with India have reinforced 
Pakistan’s Kashmir policy because it reinforced the assumptions that India never 
accepted Pakistan.  India’s occupation of Kashmir was intended to simultaneously 
demonstrate that Pakistan was politically unnecessary and physically weaken it.  Kashmir 
became sacrosanct in Pakistani politics and it is politically untenable to “lose” Kashmir.  
Over time, the cost of surrender in Kashmir has risen.  Too much Pakistani blood has 
been spilled over Kashmir for any government to survive a capitulation on Kashmir.  In 
addition to years of confidence building with India, altering Pakistan’s policy on Kashmir 
will require major domestic changes,.  The United States should, at least in the short-
term, focus on encouraging Pakistan toward a strategy that does not provoke an Indian 
retaliation that could spiral toward nuclear war. 
                                                 
13 Quoted in Sisir Gupta,  Kashmir: A Study in India-Pakistan Relations, 131.  
14 Amelie Blom, “The Multi-Vocal State: The Policy of Pakistan on Kashmir,” in Pakistan: Nationalism 
without a Nation? , ed. Christophe Jaffrelot, 283-309 (New York: Zed Books, 2002). 
9 
 
2. The Evolution of Pakistan’s Strategy 
While Pakistan’s objectives in Kashmir have been relatively unchanged 
throughout its history, Pakistan’s strategies intended to achieve these objectives have 
shifted over the last fifty years.  This thesis examines two major shifts.  The first is 
Pakistan’s decision to launch a military assault in 1965 after fourteen years of diplomacy.  
The operation failed to achieve its objectives, so Pakistan resorted to a strategy that 
focused on maintaining Kashmir’s disputed status through diplomacy in conjunction with 
the development of nuclear weapons as security guarantee.  In 1990, Pakistan’s strategy 
shifted again when it added a third element to this strategy by initiating a proxy war 
against India in Kashmir.  Three conclusions are drawn from the analysis of these shifts.  
First, changes in Pakistan’s domestic power structure have an important impact on 
Pakistan’s strategy because they can either reduce or increase the strategies available to 
the policymakers.  Second, Pakistan’s assessment of what the external environment  
necessitates or allows has been crucial to the type of strategy Pakistan utilizes.  Third, the 
U.S.-Pakistan relationship has had an important influence on Pakistan’s strategy 
decisions. 
Events related to the partition of the Indian sub-continent and the weaknesses of 
the new Pakistani state are mostly responsible for Pakistan’s uncompromising stance on 
Kashmir.  But, despite its inflexible stance, Pakistan used diplomatic instruments to 
pressure India to yield on Kashmir during the 1950s and early 1960s.  This strategy did 
not shift when India forsake the option of a plebiscite in Kashmir, the pillar of Pakistan’s 
legal position.  It only came after Pakistan assessed that it had rectified the military 
imbalance that had existed vis-à-vis India after partition and the U.S.-Pakistan 
relationship suffered a major decline.  After the United States warmed up to India during 
the early 1960s and then initiated an economic and military aid program to India after its 
war with China in 1962, Pakistan concluded that time was not on its side and that its 
window for obtaining a satisfactory solution to Kashmir was closing.  A brief uprising, 
which began after a hair believed to have belonged to the Prophet Muhammad went 
missing, provided Pakistan’s leaders with reason to believe Kashmiris were ripe for 
revolt.  However, it was nearly two years later, in August 1965, after U.S.-Pakistan 
10 
relations had gone from strained during the Kennedy Administration to poor with the 
Johnson Administration, tha t Pakistan launched a military assault into Kashmir.  It was 
an effort to accomplish militarily what their diplomatic strategy had failed to do. 
The East Pakistan rebellion and India’s intervention in 1971 divided Pakistan in 
half and resulted in the independent state of Bangladesh.  The event directly challenged 
Pakistan’s claim that all Muslims of South Asia should belong to one state.  Although the 
tenure of Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto is often seen as a period of relative stability 
in Kashmir, Bhutto’s decision to launch Pakistan’s nuclear development program and his 
rhetorical campaign to maintain Kashmir’s disputed status reveal that he conceded 
nothing to India.  In fact, Bhutto’s pursuit of nuclear weapons began the process of 
moving Pakistan’s strategy toward asymmetric options because conventional military 
options were no longer considered feasible.  Additionally, Bhutto’s mishandling of the 
political situation in Pakistan increased the popularity of Islamist forces during the 1970s.  
After his rigging of the elections in 1977, the chaos that engulfed the nation provided the 
impetus for General Muhammad Zia ul-Haq to reassert military control in Pakistan. 
Zia, a devote Muslim, recognized the popular support that the Islamist parties 
possessed and, rather than suppress them, chose to co-opt the Islamists into his 
government.  The nature of the Afghan war institutionalized the bonds between the 
military, the Islamist parties, and their associated mujahedin fighting in Afghanistan.  
Notably, as during the 1970s, Kashmir was relatively calm during most of the 1980s and 
there was little mention of cross-border terrorism by the Indian leadership.  In 1989, 
however, the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan and the following year the United 
States abandoned its relationship with Pakistan.  More importantly, in 1989 an indigenous 
Kashmiri uprising provided an opportunity for Pakistan to reverse the Indian attempts to 
degrade Kashmir’s status as disputed territory.  Without U.S. assistance and with weak 
political leadership, diverting the attention of the highly energized, extremely violent 
segment of Pakistani society returning from Afghanistan and refocusing the political 
economy that had developed to fight the Soviets was a highly attractive option.  Thus, 
Pakistan shifted from a strategy of negotiations to a proxy war strategy. 
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Pakistan’s strategy to bleed India continued through the 1990s under both Prime 
Minister Nawaz Sharif, a Punjabi with a close relationship with the Islamist parties, and 
Benazir Bhut to, the daughter of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who was educated in the West and 
espoused secular, progressive principles similar to her father.  Through most of the 
1990s, it appeared that Pakistan was getting the results it sought from its strategy in 
Kashmir.  India was unable to pacify the region, and therefore it remained an issue on the 
international agenda (although relatively low on that list).  Also, Indian soldiers were 
dying and Pakistani soldiers were not.  By 1999, however, the insurgency began to wane 
and the Pakistani-supported mujahiden had managed to alienate the Kashmiri people.  
With the threat of nuclear war looming over South Asia after India and Pakistan tested 
nuclear weapons in May 1998, Pakistan believed that it could make a limited incursion 
across the LoC and India’s ability to retaliate would be constrained because of 
international concern over the possibility of nuclear war.  Instead, the Clinton 
administration viewed Pakistan’s provocation as a threat to the entire world and Nawaz 
Sharif was offered only limited political cover and no option but to order the withdrawal 
of Pakistani forces. 
After 1999, Pakistan’s conditions and reputation in the world worsened.  In 
addition to the Kargil fiasco, Sharif’s aggressive attempts to consolidate domestic power 
alienated nearly every major power group in Pakistan, particularly the military.  Three 
months after Kargil, Sharif was overthrown in a military coup.  Pakistan was edging 
toward “rogue nation” status: it was a dictatorship, it was an illicit exporter of nuclear 
weapons and technology, it was increasingly wracked by sectarian violence and 
organized crime, and political Islam was expanding its influence, particularly in the 
NWFP and Baluchistan. 
 
C. POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES 
The terrorist attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001 dramatically 
altered the geopolitical equation in South Asia.  The Taliban’s refusal to turn over Osama 
bin Laden to the United States forced Pakistan to choose between its ally in Afghanistan 
and the United States.  Pakistan’s decision to abandon its Afghan neighbor and support 
the U.S. war against the Taliban and al Qaeda significantly improved Pakistan’s 
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economic and political position.  In exchange for its assistance, the United States lifted 
sanctions imposed on Pakistan for its nuclear tests in May 1998, increased Pakistan’s 
clothing and textile export quota by fifteen percent, provided one billion dollars in aid, 
and supported it in its efforts to restructure thirty-eight billion dollars in foreign debt.   
Despite its break with the Taliban, President Musharraf made it clear that it would 
not abandon its Kashmir policy. 15  However, Pakistan worried that India would take 
advantage of the situation to pressure Pakistan to end its support for the Kashmir 
insurgency. 16  Pakistan’s concerns were substantiated when India mobilized along the 
border in response to a terrorist assault against its Parliament building in New Delhi in 
December 2001.  The threat of war between India and Pakistan created a dilemma for the 
United States.  Pakistan is essential to the successful execution of the war against 
terrorism.  It provided bases for U.S. operations in Afghanistan and has cooperated 
extensively in U.S. counter-terror efforts.  In addition to the more than five hundred 
terrorists detained and turned over to the United States, nearly all of the high-ranking al 
Qaeda members captured to date have been caught by Pakistani authorities, including the 
suspected masterminds of the attacks on 11 September 2001.  Nevertheless, Pakistan’s 
support of the insurgency in Kashmir has been spearheaded by Islamic fundamentalists 
linked to al Qaeda.  It is a strategy that makes the U.S. war on terror appear selective, 
which damages U.S. credibility.  Moreover, it runs the risk of triggering a war between 
India and Pakistan that “has no certain terminus short of nuclear war.”17 
The United States was able to diffuse the crisis that lasted for over half of 2002 by 
getting President Musharraf to agree to crack down on militant groups in Pakistan.  He 
has outlawed several of the most ruthless and active Kashmiri militant groups and 
thousands have been arrested.  Many were subsequently released and this led to 
speculation that Pakistan was temporarily appeasing the United States and would 
continue to support the proxy war strategy once the situation cooled.  Whether or not this 
turns out to be the case largely depends on three factors, all of which point in an 
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optimistic direction at this juncture.  These factors are: the status of the U.S.-Pakistan 
relationship, India’s willingness to make a diplomatic strategy worthwhile for Pakistan, 
and Pakistan’s assessment of a proxy war strategy’s cost and benefits. 
U.S. policymakers should acknowledge that Pakistan is unable to simply abandon 
their support for the militants without substituting another strategy to replace it.  Ignoring 
the Kashmir dispute is not an option for any Pakistani government.  If Pakistan agrees to 
cut-off support to militant groups, it must be able to claim that a peaceful strategy is 
producing, or going to produce, some meaningful concessions.  One necessary 
component of any plan that shifts Pakistani strategy toward negotiations is continued U.S. 
interest in the Kashmir issue in addition to a U.S. commitment to Pakistan that extends 
beyond simply using Pakistan in the war against terror.  If Pakistan believes they are 
simply pawns in a greater U.S. game, it is unlikely to abandon its current strategy.  
Despite the current spat of anti-Americanism, Pakistanis want and value a strong 
relationship with the United States.18 
In addition to the Pakistan’s need for American involvement, the Pakistan 
government must also be able to point to an Indian willingness to consider their demands 
in Kashmir.  Militarily, India has no reason to negotiate with Pakistan over Kashmir, nor 
does India want to be seen as caving to terrorist pressure, which it believes could set a 
precedent for other regions within India that seek autonomy or independence.  However, 
Kashmir is a political problem.  Despite India’s desire to point to elections as evidence of 
Kashmiri contentment with Indian rule, the current Indian efforts to crackdown in 
Kashmir appears to be failing.  In October 2003 before the onset of winter, the violence 
in Kashmir was “in one of the bloodier phases of its 14-year insurgency,”19 and recent 
reports from human rights groups within Kashmir assert that there has been a surge in 
Kashmiri participation in the guerrilla campaign.20  India has an incentive to reverse both 
trends, and a demonstrable Indian willingness to negotiate on Kashmir would go far to 
                                                 
18 See “Text of President Musharraf’s Address to the Nation,” Dawn, 12 January 2002, 
http://www.dawn.com/2002/01/12/speech020112.htm. 
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20 David Rohde, “India Grapples With Changes in the Kashmir Insurgency,” New York Times, 16 
November 2003, http://www.nytimes.com/2003/11/16/international/asia/16KASH.html. 
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provide Pakistan with the political will to more aggressively halt the violence coming 
from its side of the border.  Without both the commitment of the United States and an 
Indian willingness to negotiate, Pakistan has limited incentive to go beyond lip service to 
the Indian demand to halt cross-border activity. 
With that said, the decision is up to Pakistan.  It is responsible for its own destiny.  
The disproportionate amount of economic resources spent on defense and war, in 
addition to the external resources that have been diverted away from Pakistan because of 
sanctions and instability, have cost Pakistan immeasurably.  The costs of the war on 
Pakistan’s society has been equally detrimental, particularly with the weapons, violence, 
and religious fundamentalism that have spilled into Pakistan as a consequence of the 
proxy wars waged in Afghanistan and Kashmir.  The two assassination attempts on 
President Musharraf in December 2003 highlight these dangers.  The United States can 
assist.  India can negotiate.  But ultimately, only Pakistan can make the decision to utilize 
a more peaceful strategy to pursue its claims to Kashmir. 
 
D. SUMMARY OF CHAPTERS 
This thesis contains five chapters.  Chapter I introduces the problem facing the 
United States today and briefly explains the underlying factors driving Pakistan’s policy 
and strategy in Kashmir.  The subsequent three chapters are organized chronologically.  
Chapter II focuses on the roots of the conflict and the foundation of Pakistan’s policy and 
Chapters III and IV addresses subsequent shifts in Pakistan’s strategy.  Chapter V 
expands on the findings of this study and their implications. 
Chapter II provides the background of the Kashmir dispute and explains why 
Pakistan’s policy on Kashmir was established.  Ethnic cleavages, weak national identity, 
limited internal security capabilities, and fragile political institutions contributed to a 
situation in which Pakistan’s leaders promoted the anti-Indian feeling that was ignited by 
partition.  The struggle in Kashmir served to reinforce anti- Indian attitudes and 
functioned to unite the various ethnic groups that composed the new Muslim state. 
Chapter III analyzes Pakistan’s decision to abandon diplomacy and launch a 
military assault into Kashmir in 1965.  Three variables account for the shift: India’s 
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abandonment of the plebiscite option, Pakistan’s belief that it had remedied the military 
imbalance that India initially possessed at partition, and a souring of U.S.-Pakistan 
relations.  These three factors converged to produce a situation in which Pakistan’s 
leaders believed its opportunity to change the status quo in Kashmir was dissipating and 
that it was necessary to act.  
Chapter IV examines the two-decade shift toward a proxy war strategy.  There are 
three elements of the evolution toward proxy war.  First, it is the product of a transition 
toward asymmetric warfare in response to the military defeats the Pakistan army endured 
in 1965 and 1971.  Second, the Islamization of Pakistani society that began in the 1960s, 
gained momentum in the 1970s, and was accelerated and expanded by the policies of Zia 
ul-Haq, when combined with the repercussions of the Afghan-Soviet war altered the 
nature of Pakistan’s politics and where power rested.  The Afghan war expanded the 
institutional linkages between Islamist organizations and the Pakistan military, 
specifically the Inter-Service Intelligence Directorate (ISI).  The Islamists and the ISI 
developed a vested interest in waging guerrilla warfare.  Third, India’s mismanagement 
in Kashmir and a decline in U.S. concern with South Asia provided Pakistan with an 
opportunity to more aggressively pursue its policy objectives in Kashmir. 
Chapter V concludes that the U.S. war on terror and India’s exploitation of the 
consequences make Pakistan’s proxy war strategy in Kashmir unviable.  One way or 
another Pakistan must change its strategy in Kashmir.  This thesis illustrates why 
Pakistan has chosen the strategies it has at particular moments and why the current 



































Although the Far Eastern Survey concluded in 1948 that it was “all but 
inevitable” that Pakistan and India would quarrel over Kashmir,21 it was not inevitable 
that the two countries would go to war, or that Kashmir would become the crucible of the 
India-Pakistan relationship.  This chapter briefly examines the beginnings of the conflict, 
describes the events that led to the war of 1948, shows the evolutionary nature of 
Pakistan strategy, and addresses why Kashmir became so important to Pakistan.  
The first section looks at Pakistan’s reasons for believing Kashmir was rightfully 
part of the new Islamic republic and how the strategy to secure Kashmir evolved from 
negotiations to war.  This first conflict is important because the way in which Pakistanis 
perceived Indian actions would have a major impact on their policy in Kashmir for the 
next fifty years.  Pakistan’s decision to go to war in 1948 was not some irredentist land 
grab designed by some fanatical Muslims in Karachi.22  Rather, Pakistan’s decision was 
based on its understanding of the strategic situation vis-à-vis India, what it believed 
India’s intentions were, as well as the realities of Pakistan’s own internal politics. 
The second section explains the domestic political dynamics that caused Pakistan 
to take an increasingly uncompromising position on Kashmir.  Uncompromising in that, 
because of the ideological nature of Pakistan’s claims to Kashmir, Pakistan’s stated 
policy on Kashmir was to reject any proposed solution that called for the division of 
Kashmir.  At the same time, internal factors, such as Pakistan’s crisis of identity, 
encouraged politicians and others to use the Kashmir dispute to unite the population by 
focusing on a common danger.  The domestic realities of this time period are significant 
because they establish the foundation of Pakistan’s policy and the persistence of those 
domestic characteristic continues to impact Pakistan policy today. 
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B. ORIGINS OF THE KASHMIR CONFLICT 
In response to the independence movement that energized the subcontinent in the 
aftermath of the Second World War, Britain tried to retreat from its colony in South Asia 
as quickly as possible in 1947.  In its haste, it decided to allow the rulers of the 565 
princely states that previously recognized the paramountcy of the British Crown to 
determine the future of their territories by fiat.  The princes were given the option to join 
either of the new states or opt for independence but were advised by Lord Louis 
Mountbatten, the British viceroy responsible for overseeing the partition process, to 
consider territorial contiguity and religious affiliation of their subjects.  The princely state 
of Kashmir was problematic because it straddled both India and Pakistan, three-quarters 
of its population was Muslim, the maharaja was a Hindu, and it was the third wealthiest 
Indian state at the time (see Figure 1).23  Mountbatten further counseled the princes that it 
would be in their own interests to accede to one of the two new states.  Most did, but 
several rulers choose independence.  Hari Singh, Kashmir’s unpopular maharaja who was 
resented by his predominantly Muslim subjects, wanted independence.  Nearly all of the 
princely states that did opt for independence were quickly incorporated or conquered by 
either Pakistan or India, but the decision by Maharaja Hari Singh of Kashmir still haunts 
the subcontinent.   
 
                                                 
23 Thorner, “The Issues in Kashmir,” 173. 
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Figure 1.   The Disputed Region of Jammu and Kashmir24 
 
As the British withdrew from South Asia in 1947, a rebellion broke out in the 
Poonch region of Kashmir.  At least one account claims that the revolt had been launched 
as early as the spring over taxation. 25  Another account claimed the revolt was touched 
off by rumors that the Maharaja had acceded to India. 26  Though the impetus and the 
timing may be debatable, there is general agreement that the rebellion was indigenous 
and was initiated by a Muslim segment of the population in the Poonch region.   
The uprising was brutally crushed by Singh’s mostly Hindu troops and, 
unsurprisingly, the movement assumed a communal character.  Once the Pashtun 
tribesmen in the tribal areas of Pakistan’s Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) learned 
of the incident they declared a jihad and began to make their way to Kashmir.  The 
tribesmen overwhelmed the prince’s troops and were approaching Srinagar, the 
                                                 
24 Economist, http://www.economist.com. 
25 Lord Birdwood, “Kashmir,” International Affairs 28 (July 1952): 302. 
26 Sir William Barton, “Pakistan’s Claim to Kashmir,” Foreign Affairs  28 (January 1950): 300. 
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Maharaja’s seat of power, when Singh fled to Jammu.  There he made an appeal to the 
Indian government for assistance. 
Prime Minister Nehru was inclined to assist Singh, but replied to the Singh that it 
would be inappropriate for India to intervene in Kashmir unless it acceded to India.  With 
the tribesmen on the doorstep of Srinagar and his circumstances growing more desperate, 
Singh signed the Instrument of Accession on October 26, 1947.  Indian troops were 
airlifted into the capital and rapidly turned the tide of the battle. 
 
1. Pakistan’s Strategy at Partition 
Until May 1948 official Pakistani involvement in the struggle was piecemeal and 
uncoordinated.  Pakistan’s resort to military force was not a strategy that Mohammed Ali 
Jinnah and his All India Muslim League (AIML) were contemplating even as late as July 
of 1947.  Jinnah’s strategy for ensuring the accession of Kashmir to Pakistan was based 
on his assumption that, “Kashmir will fall into our lap like a ripe fruit.”27  Apparently, it 
was obvious to Jinnah that Kashmir’s Muslim majority, its economic relationship with 
Pakistan, and its existing transportation and communication links with Pakistan would 
secure the accession of the third largest economic entity in British India.  By comparison, 
India lacked even a direct road to the Kashmiri capital of Srinagar.  When the rebellion 
began in August, the Pakistani government was struggling to handle the disaster Partition 
had unleashed in the Punjab while at the same time wrangling with India over its fair-
share of British India’s assets; therefore it possessed a limited capability to significantly 
impact developments in Kashmir.  Even the demand for a plebiscite in Kashmir, which 
became a critical component of their case in Kashmir, was given little support “so long as 
there remained a possibility of persuading or forcing the Maharajah to exercise his power 
of accession.”28 
Also factoring into the decision to negotiate Kashmir’s accession to Pakistan 
rather than rely on the use of force was the success that Jinnah and the Muslim League 
had experienced with constitutional bargaining and legal devices in its struggle for a 
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separate nation. 29  The new leaders applied this experience to their efforts to peaceably 
ensure the accession of princely states, like Kashmir, to Pakistan and used Standstill 
Agreements, which continued existing relationships, and Instruments of Accession.  
Operating under the assumption that Kashmir was clearly destined to be part of Pakistan, 
in conjunction with a desire to avoid war, the Pakistani government signed a Standstill 
Agreement with the Maharaja.  
The Standstill Agreement that Pakistan signed with the Maharaja shows that 
despite the conviction that Kashmir was an integral part of Pakistan’s future, Pakistan had 
essentially adopted a wait-and-see approach to the dispute.  The Pakistani government 
was not a mere bystander to be sure; the Pakistani Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan 
decided in mid-September 1947 to assist the rebels.  But the rebellion in Poonch was self-
generated, the tribesmen from the NWFP learned of the situation in Kashmir “through the 
agents of freedom fighters,”30 and though segments of the Pakistan army did assist the 
tribesmen, at least one outside observers assessed, “The tribes appear to have been 
leaderless.”31  Relying on the goodwill of the Maharaja at the outset and not fully 
comprehending his independent aspirations, the Pakistan government’s strategy toward 
Kashmir was driven by events that it played little or no role in directing.  However, the 
advance of the tribesmen set off a chain of events that brought the Indian army into 
Kashmir and in a position to occupy the entire princely state and thus pose a strategic 
threat to Pakistan’s survivability.  Therefore, Pakistan was forced to make a decision on 
whether or not it was willing to back up its claim to Kashmir with military force. 
 
2. Pakistan’s Decision to Intervene in 1948 
It would have been difficult for Pakistan’s new leaders to allow India’s army to 
take all of Kashmir in the face of the Pakistani public’s call for action.  The devastation 
and chaos that characterized partition left the population in a highly charged emotional 
condition.  According to contemporary accounts, in addition to the fiery of the frontier 
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tribesmen, Punjab, the Pakistani province tha t had suffered the most during partition and 
also the richest and most powerful, “was dangerously excited at the rumors that Dogra 
troops were driving thousands of Moslems out of Punch into Pakistan, and action to hold 
up the Indian advance seemed the only possible answer.”32   
The problem was larger than merely defying public opinion.  Even if the 
leadership attempted to dampen the inflamed public opinion, Pakistan’s leadership was 
not in a position to challenge the segments of the population most angered by the events 
in Kashmir and who had weak, if not non-existent, loyalty to the new entity called 
Pakistan.  Most significantly, the Pashtun tribesmen leading the charge in Kashmir posed 
a significant internal threat to Pakistan. 
Because of the method the British Raj had used to establish a limited amount of 
control and stability in its northwest frontier the tribesmen waging jihad were a legitimate 
threat to the nascent state at independence.  After the disasters of the two Afghan wars in 
the nineteenth-century, the British approached the frontier region with caution and 
usually chose to negotiate with the tribal leaders and influence them through 
intermediaries.  The frontier tribes, composed mostly of Pashtuns, received money and 
arms in exchange for stability and their assistance in patrolling the passes which 
connected the land routes from the sub-continent to Central Asia.  The tribes became 
relatively well armed and financed as a result of this policy.  Lt General Sir Douglas 
Gracey, a Briton who served as the first acting commander- in-chief of the Pakistan army, 
worried that, “An easy vic tory of the Indian army, particularly in the Muzaffarabad area, 
is almost certain to arouse the anger of the tribesmen against Pakistan for its failure to 
render them more direct assistance and might well cause them to turn against Pakistan.”33   
The Pakistan military was ill prepared to confront this internal security threat.  
The combination of the fragile condition of the military and the strength of the Pashtun 
tribesman had political consequences for Pakistan’s options in Kashmir.  Sir William 
Barton’s 1950 essay in Foreign Affairs provides a vivid description: 
Much has been made of the culpability of the Pakistan 
Government in not preventing the tribal people from 
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entering Kashmir in the winter of 1947-48.  If an attempt 
had been made to drive them back, the whole border from 
Chitral south to Quetta would have burst into flame, and at 
the time Pakistan forces were still disorganized and largely 
unequipped, thanks to India’s refusal to hand over 
Pakistan’s share of the military supplies left by the British.  
They could not have held down a tribal rising and might 
have been driven across the Indus.  This would have given 
the Afghans an opportunity of taking territory as far as the 
Indus, which they look on as Afghanistan irredenta.34 
The advances of the Indian military forced the Pakistan army’s hand.  Although in a bad 
position materially and politically to challenge the Pashtun thrust into Kashmir, the 
military was not completely hapless.  The success of the Indian army against the 
tribesmen led General Gracey to assess, “India is not to be allowed to sit on the doorsteps 
of Pakistan to the rear and on the flank at liberty to enter at its will and pleasure […] it is 
imperative that the Indian army is not allowed to advance.”35  Pakistan’s military 
strategists determined that Pakistan could not be a viable state if India controlled Kashmir 
in its entirety, thus the decision was made for the Pakistani army to officially enter the 
battle in May 1948.36 
The Pakistani military drove the Indian troops back enough that Pakistan felt 
strategically comfortable to sit down at the negotiating table.  Under the auspices of the 
United Nations, a ceasefire line was established and both states agreed that once Pakistani 
combatants had withdrawn and India’s had been reduced to the minimum level required 
to guarantee law and order, the status of Kashmir would “be determined in accordance 
with the will of the people.”37  In consultation with the United Nations Commission for 
India and Pakistan (UNCIP), the two countries were to negotiate a process to “determine 
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fair and equitable conditions whereby such free expression will be assured.”38  Neither 
the withdrawal nor the plebiscite was ever to occur. 
The issue would not die, however, because the nature of Pakistan’s internal 
politics made it very difficult for any Pakistani leader to settle the issue without major 
concessions from the Indian government.  The concessions were not forthcoming. 
   
C. DOMESTIC POLITICS BEHIND PAKISTAN’S KASHMIR POLICY 
Pakistan secured control over one-third of Kashmir and largely ameliorated its 
strategic concerns with the cease-fire agreement in January 1949,39 but Pakistan choose 
to continue the struggle for Kashmir rather than accept the cease-fire line as the border 
with India.  This section explains why Pakistan insisted on continuing its quest for 
Kashmir’s right to self-determination instead of agreeing to divide Kashmir along the 
cease-fire line. 
Pakistan’s Kashmir policy is embedded in the nature of its internal politics at 
independence.  The tragedy of partition and Kashmir’s symbolism for the new nation 
made it extremely difficult for any Pakistani government to simply acquiesce to the status 
quo in Kashmir.  In addition to the fact that Pakistanis believed that Kashmir should have 
been part of Pakistan, the public rage after Partition, and Pakistan’s limited internal 
security capabilities discussed above, there were three additional reasons for Pakistan’s 
decision to support the Kashmiri struggle and those groups within Pakistan that fought it: 
Kashmir’s symbolism to the new nation, weak national identity, and Pakistan’s 
institutional imbalance. 
 
1. Kashmir’s Implications  for Pakistan 
To Pakistan, Kashmir status demonstrated that India never accepted Pakistan’s 
existence.  Although Kashmir straddled both India and Pakistan, Kashmir’s religious 
composition and its economic and logistical connections to the region that became 
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Pakistan made it apparent to Muslims that Kashmir would join the new Muslim nation.40  
In fact, after the acceptance for the demand for Pakistan, “the AIML had hardly any 
doubts about Kashmir’s accession to Pakistan.”41  When Kashmir did not “fall into their 
laps” as Jinnah expected, it came to symbolize the treachery of Hindu leaders and their 
British patrons.  From the Pakistani perspective, India’s claim to Kashmir exhibited its 
desire to weaken and dominate Pakistan, while also demonstrating India’s belief that 
Jinnah’s two-nation theory was a fallacy.  Therefore, the struggle for Kashmir was the 
struggle against Indian domination and manipulation.   
In addition to Pakistan’s belief that Kashmir was India’s attempt to discredit 
Pakistan, the circumstances surrounding the struggle for Kashmir at partition appeared to 
indicate British complicity in the Hindu plot.  Specifically, Kashmir was seen as 
Mountbatten’s attempt to assist his friend, Jawaharlal Nehru. 42  This perception that 
India’s actions toward the Kashmir issue were part of a Indo-British conspiracy 
calculated to weaken Pakistan also contributed to Pakistan’s approach to the Kashmir 
dispute. 
 
2. Pakistan’s National Identity Challenge 
The view that Kashmir was an attempt to erode Pakistan’s independence provided 
the ideological and emotional underpinnings of Pakistan’s position, but internal politics 
also contributed to Pakistan’s policy on Kashmir.  One important factor leading to 
Pakistan’s policy was the crisis of identity that Pakistan suffered from the moment of 
independence.43  The problem was arguably explained best by Ayub Khan, when he 
remarked, that prior to 1947 “none of us was in fact a Pakistani.”44  Although Jinnah’s 
two-nation theory divided the subcontinent along religious lines, Islam alone had not 
been a strong enough force for Jinnah to forge a sense of nationalism. 45  One reason that 
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Pakistan’s Islamic identity was problematic was because the predominantly secular-
leaning leadership did not want to make Islam the sole basis of national identity because 
it had the potential of ceding power to the religious authorities.  Pakistan’s new secular 
leadership envisioned a secular, Islamic state and too much focus on Islam could provide 
the traditional religious authorities a lever on which to assume political authority.   
But the primary reason for Pakistan’s identity crisis was that ethnic and tribal 
loyalties trumped any religious or national ones. The Pashtun in the NWFP are one 
example how ethnic division were a problem for the new state and how Kashmir became 
tied to internal issues.  The area that constituted the Northwest Frontier Province of 
British India was primarily populated by Pashtuns and abutted Afghanistan, which had a 
Pashtun majority and a Pashtun ruler.  Even after the two disastrous Afghan wars the 
British were intent on preventing a Russian advance through either the Khyber or Bolan 
Pass and in addition to arming the tribes, also allowed the tribes a level of autonomy 
comparable to the princely states.  The use of intermediaries to extend British influence, 
known as the Sandeman system, resulted in the continuation of tribal and ethnic loyalties 
in the NWFP and the provinces inhabitants felt little loyalty or solidarity to a larger 
Muslim community in South Asia.  When the prospect of independence arose, Gaffar 
Khan, the “Frontier Gandhi,” was remarkably successful in mobilizing a Pashtun 
nationalist movement that sought independence for the NWFP.  In fact, had it not been 
for Jinnah’s ability to convince Mountbatten that allowing independence for ethnic 
groups could open a Pandora’s box, it is likely the NWFP and the adjacent tribal areas 
would have opted for independence.46   
When the vote was held to determine to which nation the NWFP would join, 
Ghaffar Khan boycotted it, but the decision for the Pashtun Muslims who did vote was 
easy—99 percent voted to join Pakistan. 47  Despite the overwhelming vote in favor of 
accession to Pakistan, the central government in Karachi realized the Pashtuns were 
going to be a problem.  The nascent government was in no position to directly challenge 
the relatively well-armed tribesmen, and the jihad in Kashmir served as a useful 
distraction from the idea of a Pashtunistan, the proposed homeland for Pakistan’s 
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Pashtuns.48  To add to Pakistan’s troubles, Afghanistan made claims to Pashtunistan and 
used this claim as justification for voting against Pakistan’s membership in the United 
Nations. 
 
Figure 2.   Pakistan’s Major Ethnic Groups49 
 
Besides the Pashtuns, Pakistan consisted of four other major ethnic groups: 
Baloch, Punjabi, Sindhi, and Mohajir (see Figure 2).  The Mohajirs, Muslims that fled 
from areas of South Asia that had become part of India, possessed a disproportionate 
amount of political power because of their positions in the Muslim League.  Sensitive to 
their status as minorities and transplants, many Mohajirs were the most ardent advocates 
of the two-nation theory and because of this they were especially sensitive to India’s 
attempt to annex Kashmir.  Surrounded by Pashtuns and Punjabis, ethnic groups that had 
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reputations as fierce warriors, the Mohajirs reluctance to appear weak also contributed to 
their refusal to concede on the highly charged issue of Kashmir. 
With both ethnic and religious definitions of nationality problematic, Pakistani 
leaders attempted to rally the new nation against the threat of the imposing Hindu 
neighbor as a way to forge a sense of unity.  The consequence of the focus on India was 
the “India syndrome,” defined by Jean Luc-Racine, as “a feeling of insecurity [that] has 
been nurtured constantly since 1947 […] its successive leaders have not been able to free 
the national mind from its Indian obsession—rather, they used it deliberately for their 
own purposes.”50  Therefore, the decision to fight for Kashmir not only had ideology to 
support it, but it also had the political objectives, primarily that the struggle for Kashmir 
served to strengthen the tenuous national bonds of the new nation-state. 
 
3. Institutional Imbalance 
In conjunction with these nationalist goals, the internal struggle between the 
newly forming institutions further contributed to Pakistan’s uncompromising position on 
Kashmir.  Pakistan’s prospects for a strong, secular, civilian government suffered a major 
blow when Jinnah died shortly after partition.  Therefore, power rapidly devolved to the 
institutions that had been previously established by the British—the military and the 
bureaucracy.  Prior to 1956, political power rested mostly in the hands of the Governor-
General.  The prime minister and his cabinet possessed very little power.  In fact, they 
served at the behest of the governor-general.  This early institutional imbalance had 
several political consequences with regards to Pakistan’s strategy toward Kashmir.   
First, in order to compensate for their lack of real power, politicians attempted to 
build a political base by pandering to the public’s emotions.  When combined with the 
Pakistani identity problem, this produced a situation in which the politicians played 
cheerleader to the public’s rage over Kashmir.  In August of 1953, at a large 
demonstration in Karachi protesting the Indian government’s removal and arrest of 
Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah, the Pakistani Prime Minister told the crowd that his 
government would not rest “until they have secured for the people of Kashmir their 
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inalienable right to determine their future by free exercise of their vote.”51  Three days 
later at an Independence Day celebration he declared: “We are bound to the people of 
Kashmir by ties of religion, culture, tradition, economy and geography.  It is but natural 
that we should feel the deepest sympathy for them in their hour of trial.” 52   
Kashmir’s implications for Pakistan’s sovereignty and national identity, 
Pakistan’s internal divisions and weaknesses, and the imbalance in institutional strength 
led Pakistan to see Kashmir in unconditional terms.  Kashmir became a crucial element 
of the larger struggle between the Muslim League and Congress, members of which 
dominated both the Pakistani and Indian leadership positions respectively, meant that the 
dispute assumed a role larger than its strategic significance.  In Pakistan’s case the 
dispute had dual purposes.  On one had, Kashmir was an ideological struggle against 
India and its ambitions.  On the other, the dispute served to unite an otherwise fractured 
polity.  Since it had both ideological and nationalist implications, neither of which is 
easily compromised, Pakistan’s policy toward Kashmir became rigid and unyielding. As 
early as 1951 the Pakistani leadership’s policy was evident.  During January of that year, 
the apprentice of Jinnah, Prime Minister Liaquat Ali, under the pressure of the upcoming 
elections in Punjab refused to attend the annual Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ 
Conference unless the issue of Kashmir was included on the agenda.  The issue was 
eventually added, and he agreed to attend.  At the meeting, he rejected any proposal that 
called for the partition of Kashmir.53  This refusal to acquiesce to Kashmir’s partition 
became an enduring component of Pakistan’s Kashmir policy.  A policy that refused to 
accept the ceasefire line as the international border and demanded that Kashmir’s status 
be determined by the will of the people in a plebiscite called for in the 1949 United 
Nations Resolutions.   
Although Kashmir has some strategic and security relevance, Kashmir’s 
importance to Pakistan is driven by its implications for Pakistan’s sovereignty and 
national identity.  To Jinnah and his Muslim League colleagues, India’s actions in 
Kashmir demonstrated that it never accepted Pakistan’s claim to nationhood.  India’s 
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attempts to integrate Kashmir into its purportedly secular system of government was 
intended to display the needlessness of Pakistan.  As Pakistan faced its internal 
difficulties Kashmir was an issue that garnered nearly unanimous support among 
Pakistan’s people, parties, and institutions.  Therefore, Pakistan’s stated policy on 
Kashmir was that it sought self-determination for all of Kashmir and that the state was 
indivisible.   
 
D. CONCLUSION 
Although Hari Singh’s decision was bound to lead to some level of disagreement 
between India and Pakistan, the war of 1948 and Pakistan’s decision to adopt an 
uncompromising policy were not inevitable.  Pakistan’s decision to intervene directly in 
the Kashmir dispute came only after the Indian army began to threaten the strategic 
viability of the new state.  It is significant on this point to remember the fact that it was a 
British officer who made this assessment and who commanded the Pakistan army during 
the 1948 war because it demonstrates that Pakistan’s strategic concerns were real and not 
conjured up in order to rally the public against India.  However, strategic necessity does 
not explain Pakistan’s policy or strategy beyond 1949.   
It is necessary to look at the Pakistan’s internal politics to understand why its 
leaders choose to continue a struggle against a foe that it possessed few advantages 
against and little leverage over.  The fragile nature of Pakistan’s identity was a major 
reason for continuing the struggle beyond 1949 and so was the institutional imbalance 
that caused Pakistan’s civilian leaders to seek political mileage from the dispute.  
Ironically, however, it was India’s actions in the Kashmir dispute that provided the 
ideological and emotional material necessary for Pakistan’s struggle in Kashmir.  From 
Pakistan’s perspective, India had every intention of dominating South Asia and its actions 
in Kashmir was merely one in a series of Indian actions that revealed that plan.  In the 
princely states of Junagarh and Hyderabad (the richest princely state) where 
circumstances were the reverse of Kashmir—the rulers were Muslims but only a Muslim 
minority resided within their states—India ignored the wishes of the rulers and used 
military force to subdue the states. 
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India’s actions and Pakistan’s internal realities have led Pakistan’s leaders to 
adopt a policy that refuses to recognize the cease-fire line as the border no matter how 
politically expedient.  The factors driving Pakistan’s Kashmir policy have changed little 
since 1947.  Pakistan has yet to ameliorate its ethnic problems, its ability to assert its writ 
throughout the country remains dubious, the institutional imbalance has only worsened, 
and the unending hostilities with India have bolstered Pakistan’s attitudes about India’s 
hegemonic ambitions.  Therefore, Pakistan’s policy has changed little since the 
establishment of this policy.  Nevertheless, after the cease-fire went into effect on 1 
January 1949 Pakistan sought to remedy the situation through negotiations rather than 
force.  The next chapter discusses why Pakistan choose this strategy and why it 




























































THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
33 
III. THE FAILURE OF DIPLOMACY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In August 1965, Pakistan launched a military operation into Kashmir.  The 
operation was planned to have two stages.  The first stage envisioned a contingent of 
insurgents infiltrating across the cease-fire line and seizing the radio station and the 
Srinagar airport.  This failed.  The second stage was intended to capitalize on the disarray 
that was expected to consume the Indians after Kashmir was “liberated” and consisted of 
a military invasion designed to take the Pathankot road, which if secured would have cut 
the Indians off from the Valley of Kashmir.  The second stage was executed reasonably 
well, but  when the Indian army broadened the war by attacking across the international 
border and headed toward the Punjabi city of Lahore.  The Pakistani army was caught off 
guard and the city was left totally exposed.  Unwilling to risk the loss of Lahore, Pakistan 
created a moat by destroying around seventy bridges that crossed a canal just outside the 
city.  At the same time, the Indian army also made a surge toward the town of Sialkot.  
The Indian decision to threaten major Pakistani cities produced its desired effect, the war 
quickly ground to a stalemate and Pakistan agreed to withdraw its forces.54   
Although Operation GIBRALTAR, the insurgency stage, and Operation 
GRANDSLAM, the military assault, were poorly planned and had additional problems in 
their execution, the details of the operations lie outside the scope of this thesis.  This 
chapter is concerned with why Pakistan shifted from diplomacy to military force in its 
effort to seek a satisfactory solution to the Kashmir dispute.   
This chapter examines the dynamic that led Pakistan to instigate a war that caused 
the United States to halt its aid to the country and also started the unraveling of Ayub 
Khan’s presidency.  The first section addresses why Pakistan’s Kashmir strategy initially 
consisted of negotiations and appeals to the United Nations after 1949.  The second 
section explains why the factors contributing to Pakistan’s decision to negotiate were no 
longer in place by 1965. The third section analyzes the aftermath of the 1965 war and 
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how Pakistan adjusted its Kashmir strategy to the new domestic and international realities 
of the day.     
 
B. PAKISTAN’S STRATEGY: FROM DIPLOMACY TO WAR 
In 1965, after five years of declining amicability between the United States and 
Pakistan, President Johnson cancelled a scheduled meeting with President Ayub Khan.  
While the cancellation itself can not be said to have caused Pakistan’s decision to resort 
to a military option, it did signal the death for the only extant external factor restraining 
Pakistan from seeking a military solution.  With these restraints removed, and with India 
accelerating its efforts to integrate Kashmir into India’s political system by stripping it of 
its special status, Pakistan began to see time as its enemy. 
Pakistan attempted to negotiate a settlement to the Kashmir dispute from 1949 to 
1965 despite its no-compromise Kashmir policy for three primary reasons.  First, Nehru’s 
adherence to the logic that a plebiscite was necessary for the accession to be considered 
legitimate.  Second, the Pakistani army recognized its military disadvantage vis-à-vis 
India.  Finally, the dominate powers in Pakistan, the military and the bureaucracy, were 
intent on building a relationship with the West and obtaining Western aid, particularly 
military equipment and training.  They realized that open hostilities with India would 
have disrupted these efforts.  For these reasons, Pakistan implemented a strategy of 
diplomacy.  However, this section shows that when these reasons for restraint were 
removed Pakistan abandoned its attempts to negotiate a settlement with India and 
attempted to apply a military solution to the Kashmir dispute. 
After the Indian-Pakistan war of 1948 ground to a stalemate, Pakistan’s Kashmir 
strategy was to negotiate a resolution.  Initially, it was willing to negotiate because India 
agreed that a plebiscite was necessary in order to determine the will of the people.  
Pakistan believed the results of the plebiscite would be in its favor and this strategy made 
sense.  But India abandoned its commitment to a plebiscite in the mid-1950s and Pakistan 
continued to use peaceful means and sought ways to use diplomacy to pressure India.  
The reason Pakistan continued to use diplomacy as a tool to achieve its objectives in 
Kashmir was primarily because the dominant players in Pakistan’s domestic politics 
considered its relationship with the West, namely the United States, a higher priority.  
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The military and bureaucratic leaders believed that Pakistan’s future lay in a robust 
alliance with the West.  Once it was rebuffed by India, the United States was eager to 
satisfy Pakistan’s desires for ties with the West.  The U.S. worked to incorporate Pakistan 
into its security arrangements, such as Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) and 
Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), as well as provided large amounts of 
military and economic aid.  This relationship had contradictory consequences for the 
Kashmir dispute.  On one hand, the U.S.-Pakistan relationship provided Pakistan with the 
patronage of a superpower that would support its case at the United Nations.  Also, the 
relationship constrained Pakistan’s strategy because the United States was intent on 
preventing war.55  On the other hand, however, the U.S. military assistance to Pakistan 
made India more averse to discussing the issue of Kashmir.   
During the early 1960s, the variables constraining Pakistan’s strategy shifted.  For 
one, the U.S. military aid served its purpose and the Pakistan army was a force that could 
conceivably defeat an Indian force that was stretched thin along its massive borders.  
Second, and most importantly, Pakistan reevaluated its relationship with the United 
States during the 1960s because of U.S. overtures to India.  By 1965, the influence that 
the United States had over Pakistani decision-makers had seriously declined and Pakistan 
lost faith that diplomatic measures would facilitate a satisfactory outcome in Kashmir. 
It is important to note that after the military took control over the Pakistan 
government its strategy toward Kashmir was not very different from the previous civilian 
governments.  Only when the external situation began to shift did the military 
government alter its strategy toward Kashmir.  Time became of the essence in the mid-
1960s as the Indian strategy to absorb Kashmir progressed, the United Nations was seen 
as useless, and the United States began providing military aid to India on a level that 
Pakistan perceived as threatening to the already precarious balance of power on the 
subcontinent.  With these threatening circumstances converging, Pakistan altered their 
strategy in Kashmir.  
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1. Plebiscite and the United Nations Paralysis 
Until 1953, diplomacy appeared to be making headway toward a positive solution 
to the issue.  After Sheikh Abdullah was arrested in August that year the Pakistani public 
became enraged and the press agitated the situation by reporting exaggerated accounts of 
events.  Pakistani Prime Minister Mohammed Ali Bogra attempted to ease the tension by 
requesting a meeting with Nehru.  The two met and  issued a joint communiqué that 
stated: 
Both the Prime Ministers were actuated by a firm resolve to 
settle these problems as early as possible peacefully and 
cooperatively to the mutual advantage of both countries. … 
The most feasible method of ascertaining the wishes of the 
people was by a fair and impartial plebiscite. … the next 
step would be the appointment of a Plebiscite 
Administrator. … by the end of April 1954.56 
The proposal promptly stalled, however, on the UN’s choice of United States Admiral 
Chester Nimitz for Plebiscite Administrator.  The negotiations continued through the rest 
of the year, but when Nehru got word of the aid package that Pakistan had negotiated 
with the United States he wrote, “The decision to give this aid has changed the whole 
context of the Kashmir issue, and the long talks we have had about this matter have little 
relation to the new facts which flow from this aid.”57  He added, “Now that the presence 
of arms has taken the place of the previous peaceful and cooperative approach … we can 
take no risks now.”58  The talks continued but were inconsequential.   
After 1954, India accelerated the process of integrating Kashmir into its political 
system in an effort to make it impractical and politically unrealistic to hold a plebiscite. 59  
Indian efforts to remove Kashmir’s special status were accelerated further after its war 
with China in 1962.  Two articles of the Indian Constitution previously not applicable to 
Kashmir were made so, and Kashmir’s legislature changed the name of the Kashmir 
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head-of-state to governor and the Kashmir prime minister to chief minister.60  The name 
changes were essentially demotions and were intended to give New Delhi more control in 
Kashmir. 
Pakistan’s hopes that the United Nations would resolve the issue in accordance 
with its earlier resolutions dimmed during the early 1960s.  Ayub’s Foreign Minister, 
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, summarized this disappointment in a 1964 speech in London: 
In 1948 the Security Council adopted a resolution which 
embodied a comprehensive plan for the settlement of the 
Kashmir question.  The Soviet Union permitted passage of 
this resolution by abstaining from casting a vote on it.  The 
Soviet Union maintained this posture until 1953, during 
which period the Council made several attempts […] to 
move towards a peaceful solution of the problem.  In 1954 
and 1955 Pakistan entered into certain agreements for 
mutual defence with the United States and the United 
Kingdom.  That led the Soviet Union to change its policy in 
respect of the Kashmir question and, from 1957 onwards, 
the Soviet Union has consistently obstructed the passage of 
any adequate resolutions on that question. […] It is small 
wonder that, as a result, there was a revulsion of feeling 
against the Security Council.61 
 
India’s abandonment of the plebiscite in 1954 did not trigger a war, nor did its 
efforts to erode Kashmir’s special status.  Pakistan was not in a position to annex 
Kashmir militarily in the early 1950s, but the assistance Pakistan received from the West 
over the next decade would contribute to a belief among Pakistani strategist in 1965 that 
it could.  As the possibility of a UN settlement diminished and the U.S.-Pakistan 
relationship soured, Pakistan shifted its strategy in Kashmir. 
 
2. The U.S.-Pakistan Relationship 
Despite assertions that the military inserted itself into Pakistan’s political process 
because the civilian leadership was less hawkish on Kashmir, the strategy of the military 
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government had important continuities that indicate that this probably was not the case.62  
After General Ayub Khan took power in 1958, he attempted to ease tensions by exposing 
the irresponsible behavior of the political class in Pakistan.  “Against India they scream 
for war, knowing full well that they will be nowhere near the firing line.”  Shortly 
thereafter he added, “No Pakistani can forget Kashmir.  We in the Army feel it more 
because we recognized the significance of the problem.  Our efforts will be directed 
towards solving the problem satisfactorily and peacefully.”63  In addition to the rhetorical 
restraint, the military’s position on Kashmir in the late 1950s was demonstrated by the 
lack of support Iskander Mirza, Pakistan’s first president after the 1956 constitution and 
former secretary of defense, provided to a plan by the Kashmir Liberation Movement to 
cross the ceasefire line.  The argument of Muhammad Saraf, a leading Kashmiri activist, 
that crossing the ceasefire line would invoke the attention of the international community 
was dismissed because Mirza did not want to provoke India.64  In late 1959, Ayub Khan 
even suggested the idea of joint defense agreement to Nehru.  However, both men 
recognized the Kashmir issue must first be resolved before such a proposal was 
feasible.65 
It appears that the reason for the constraint demonstrated by the military-
bureaucratic leadership was because of the high value they placed on fostering a close 
relationship with the West.  A pro-Western alliance between the military and the 
bureaucracy was established early in Pakistan.  These two institutions were the remnants 
of the British system and believed that Pakistan’s future success hinged on a strong 
relationship with the West.  From their perspective, Kashmir could be politicized both 
domestically and internationally to the point that it served their interests, but it would not 
be the centerpiece of Pakistan’s foreign policy.  Prior to 1956, Secretary Mirza and Ayub 
Khan, then Commander- in-Chief of the Pakistan army, worked closely to ensure 
Pakistan’s overall foreign policy was controlled by the military rather than the politicians 
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who Ayub was determined to prevent from getting “out of hand” and whom he had 
counseled to “go wholeheartedly with the West.”66  When Prime Minister Nazimuddin 
attempted to link Pakistan’s relationship with the West to satisfactory solutions on the 
Kashmir and Palestine issues he was quickly dismissed by Governor-General Ghulam 
Mohammad.  As head of the bureaucracy, Ghulam Mohammad agreed with Ayub, who 
was less concerned with relations with the Islamic world or an immediate solution to 
Kashmir and was more determined to maintain ties with the West.67 
The decision to ally with the United States resulted in over $1.3 billion in 
economic and military assistance between 1955 and 1965, and although this assistance 
ultimately strengthened the military and contributed to its assessment that it could 
forcibly annex Kashmir in 1965, it also gave the United States a significant amount of 
influence over the Pakistani government.  President Dwight Eisenhower’s comments to 
Jawaharlal Nehru in 1959 revealed the nature of that influence:  “I also told Mr. Nehru 
that so far as any risk of danger that Pakistan might attack India is concerned, I could not 
believe there is even a remote possibility, and furthermore I believe the United States 
could be effective in preventing it.”68  Nonetheless, American influence and Pakistani 
willingness to bend to American pressure would decline significantly with the departure 
of the Eisenhower administration. 
In 1960 the U.S.-Pakistan relationship began to sour.  In a 1964 essay for Foreign 
Affairs, President Ayub Khan summarized the Pakistani sense of betrayal by the United 
States:  “Over the years, [non-alignment] has come to assume a mantle of respectability 
in American eyes.  Indeed, some four years ago it gradually began to occupy in American 
estimation, a privileged position.”  Four years ago meant 1960, John F. Kennedy’s 
assumption of office.  Ayub added, “In particular, influential American circles began to 
advocate ‘massive aid’ to India.” 69  Khalid bin Sayeed, a Pakistani scholar, wrote in 
March 1964, “Ever since President Kennedy assumed office in Washington, Pakistanis 
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became increasingly suspicious of American policy toward Pakistan” and there existed 
the belief that “Harvard intellectua ls” within his administration even de- legitimized 
Pakistan’s right to exist separate from India.70 
Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., Kennedy’s special assistant, confirms the Pakistani 
assessment of the Kennedy administration in his exhaustive chronicle of the Kennedy 
years, A Thousands Days.  “Of all the neutral countries, Kennedy was most interested in 
India, which he had long regarded as ‘the key area’ in Asia,” writes Schlesinger.71  After 
the Chinese crushed the Indians in the Aksai Chin war in the fall of 1962 the United 
States rapidly fulfilled India’s request for assistance.  The initial response included 
around sixty planeloads of automatic weapons and ammunition, but the Pakistanis were 
more concerned with the hastily negotiated defense assistance agreement between India 
and the United States.  Ayub Khan expressed his concern with the “massive aid from the 
West” which “arose from the fact that the Indian military build-up was aimed solely 
against Pakistan.”72  The American military aid contributed to a growing opinion in 
Pakistan that its support for the United States in the Cold War was taken for granted.  
Ayub Khan concluded that the military aid which India received after its clash with China 
removed the “remaining distinction between Pakistan and ‘non-aligned’ India.”73  He 
added in the same Foreign Affairs essay, “ We consider that this continued arming of 
India … poses a serious threat to Pakistan’s security.”74 
The U.S. assistance to India was more than just a response to the Aksai Chin war.  
It was part of a strategic shift toward India.  In a meeting with the National Security 
Council in January 1963, Kennedy laid it out:  
There is criticism about our lack of difference between the 
Allies and the neutrals.  The [sic] Pakistanis are critical, but 
we must recognize the importance of the Indians. […] 
While doing this we have moved away from the Pakistanis 
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and they are moving closer to the Chinese and against the 
Indians.  We have not been able to persuade the Pakistanis 
or the Afghanistans to change their policy on India.  These 
forces were there long before we came on the scene and we 
cannot do much about it – we cannot settle all the disputes, 
but we want to keep them free from the Communists.75 
 
As the U.S-Pakistan relationship cooled, the Sino-Pakistan relationship markedly 
improved during the latter half of the 1950s.  In March of 1963, Pakistan and China 
settled a border agreement that ceded a portion of Kashmir to the Chinese.  Believing 
they had secured China’s involvement in the Kashmir dispute, Pakistani enthusiasm over 
its relationship with China was nearly unrestrained.  Foreign Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto 
declared in an address to Pakistan’s National Assembly four months after the agreement: 
“An attack by India on Pakistan involves the territorial integrity and security of the 
largest state in Asia.”76 
Pakistan’s pursuit of a closer relationship with the Chinese caused consternation 
in Washington and became a major point of contention between the United States and 
Pakistan during the Johnson administration.  In a National Intelligence Estimate prepared 
in March 1965, U.S. frustration with developments was evident:  “In essence, the Paks 
seem to have arrived at the conclusion they can have their cake and eat it too.  Actually, 
Pakistan is being a lot more friendly to Peiping than to Washington, despite the fact that 
we still pay all the bills (about $450million in FY64).”77 
In contrast to Eisenhower’s belief that the U.S. could prevent Pakistan from 
attacking India, when fighting broke out in the Rann of Kutch in April of 1965 a State 
Department memorandum concluded that U.S. “leverage in both countries [was] at a low 
point.”78  And, during a meeting with President Johnson and his top aides, which was 
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convened to address the hostilities in Kashmir in September that year, “The President 
said he had found out over the last few months how little influence we had with the Paks 
or Indians.”79 
Ayub Khan acknowledges that Pakistan’s perception of the United States had 
shifted dramatically during the early 1960s.  He wrote in his autobiography, Friends Not 
Masters, “We could not ignore the growing military strength of India and we could not 
rely on the United States coming to our assistance if India were to embark on aggression 
against us.”80  By August of 1965, the two factors that had previously restrained Pakistan 
after India’s abandonment of the plebiscite idea in 1954 had dissipated.  The Pakistan 
military had leveled out the military imbalance that existed with India  at partition and the 
ability of the United States to influence Pakistani decisions had declined dramatically 
despite the aid the United States had provided, and was continuing to provide, to the 
Pakistani government.  
 
3. Catalysts 
In December 1963 a strand of hair believed to be from the beard of the Prophet 
Mohammad, the most sacred Muslim relic in Kashmir, was stolen from the mosque at 
Hazratbul.  The Kashmir Valley went into a brief chaotic spell which included riots and 
protests.  The relic was quickly discovered by the Indian Intelligence Bureau and  
returned.  The issue was defused almost completely in February 1964 when a panel of 
holy men confirmed the authenticity of the restored relic.  According to author Victoria 
Schofield, Ayub Khan, under the advice of his civilian advisors, Bhutto and Aziz Ahmed, 
Ayub’s Indian affairs expert, came to the conclusion that the Islamic fervor unleashed by 
the relic incident indicated that “the valley of Kashmir appeared ripe for revolt.”81 
Although the event contributed to Pakistan’s overall picture of the situation, its 
importance should not be exaggerated.  There were other periods of Kashmiri discontent 
prior to the Hazratbul incident, most notably the protests that followed Sheikh Abdullah’s 
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dismissal and arrest in 1953, and in those cases the Pakistani leadership did not determine 
that a military assault was feasible or necessary.  Also, if Pakistan’s leaders believed 
Kashmir was “ripe,” then why was Operation GIBRALTAR initiated almost two years 
later?  The event is important not because it fundamentally changed Pakistan’s 
perceptions of the Kashmir dispute and lead them to miscalculate, rather it could only be 
important because the strategic environment in which Pakistan was operating had been 
dramatically altered. 
In the year following the Hazratbul incident, Pakistani military strategist were 
able to confirm (they thought) their assessment that the strategic environment had been 
altered during the Rann of Kutch dispute.  Pakistan’s probes into a disputed march along 
its southeast border with India was met with a tepid response.82  At the same time, 
Pakistan’s relationship with the United States had been fundamentally altered and in the 
spring of 1965 President Lyndon Johnson cancelled his meeting with President Ayub 
only weeks before it was scheduled to take place.  Pakistan was stunned and angry.  Its 
perception that the United States had forsaken its alliance with Pakistan was further 
reinforced and it was assessed that if the situation continued on its current course, an 
amenable solution to Kashmir could be lost forever.  In fact, it served to reinforced Ayub 
Khan’s conclusion that the U.S. decision to provide aid to India after its war with China 
without securing an agreement on Kashmir first, had virtually eliminated all hope of 
solving the issue diplomatically.  According to Ayub, the negotiations that followed the 
U.S. aid agreement were the “same old story.” 
The Indians were playing for time.  They had been able to 
secure a great deal of arms aid from the West and a joint 
statement promising talks on Kashmir did not seem too big 
a price to them.  We had know all along that without direct 
U.S. interest India would not budge an inch […] The great 
opportunity which history had offered for a settlement of 
the Jammu and Kashmir dispute was thus lost.  Once the 
United States and other western countries had decided that 
they would not link arms aid to India with a settlement of 
the Kashmir dispute, the Indians were under no compulsion 
to enter into any serious discussion with Pakistan. 83 
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Ayub’s assessment may, or may not, have been correct.  However, it demonstrates that 
Pakistan believed the opportunity to resolve the Kashmir dispute through diplomatic 
means was dissipating. 
In response to changes in the external situation, Pakistan developed an operation 
intended to capitalize on Kashmiri discontent.  The operation was spearheaded by an 
infiltration of Pakistani forces, disguised as guerrilla forces, into the Kashmir Valley.  
According to the plan, the infiltrators would then mobilize the Kashmiri population and 
liberate them.  As discussed above, events did not unfold as planned and Operation 
GIBRALTAR and the subsequent military operation, Operation GRAND SLAM, failed 
to achieve their objectives.  At the Tashkent ceasefire negotiations that followed, it was 
agreed that the status quo would be restored.  Curiously, the public was led to believe that 
the Pakistani army had actually won the war and that Ayub Khan had squandered the 
victory at Tashkent.  When the public learned of the terms of the Tashkent Agreement  
violent demonstrations took place in Pakistan’s major cities. 
 
C. ORIGINS OF THE SHIFT TOWARD ASYMMETRY: REALIGNMENT 
OF DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS 
After the 1965 war, Pakistan’s domestic politics spiraled into turmoil.  When the 
dust settled six years later, the military was out of power and discredited, Pakistan was 
split into two nations, Islamist forces within Pakistan were expanding their political 
influence, and the most powerful man in the country, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, obtained the 
position of prime minister on a platform that was populist, anti-American, and pro-China.  
These factors forced Pakistan to re-evaluate their strategy in Kashmir and resulted in a 
shift back toward negotiations on the Kashmir issue and toward the exploration of 
asymmetric alternatives to challenge India. 
 
1. The Division of Pakistan and the Military’s Nadir 
The military’s dominance began to fade in the aftermath of the Operation 
GRANDSLAM debacle.  The Pakistani population, led by the press to believe the 
military was victorious on the battle field, was disgusted when the terms of the 1966 
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Tashkent Agreement became known. 84  The public was convinced Ayub Khan had 
incompetently handled the negotiations because his former foreign minister, Zulfikar Ali 
Bhutto, alleged the Tashkent Agreement “contained secret clauses detrimental to 
Pakistan’s national interests.”85   
Further damage to Ayub’s reputation domestically was done when the U.S. 
conditioned the restoration of economic aid on his government’s acceleration of the 
family planning program, which offended the religiously conservative segments of 
Pakistan’s population, and a unilateral reduction of military expenditure by five percent, 
which alienated those Pakistanis who believed a strong military was critical to Pakistan’s 
existence, especially in light of the American decision to severe aid during the 1965 
war.86   When combined with Pakistan’s faltering economy in the late 1960s, Ayub’s 
policies benefited both the Islamist and socialist parties in West Pakistan, especially 
Bhutto’s Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP).  In East Pakistan, the situation was deteriorating 
and the military regime became entangled with the boiling Bengali nationalist movement.   
In March 1969, the pressures overwhelmed Ayub and he resigned.  He 
unconstitutionally designated his Commander- in-Chief, Yahya Khan, as his replacement.  
Yahya Khan recognized that sustaining military rule would be difficult in such an 
unfavorable environment. Thus, he made the rapid establishment of civilian government 
one of his primary objectives.  He presided over national elections in December 1970.  
The public’s dissatisfaction with military rule was confirmed by the results; all former 
military officers who ran for office lost.87   
The election results revealed the ethnic cleavages that still divided Pakistan and 
political changes sweeping its society.  The Awami League, the Bengali nationalist party, 
led by Mujib Rahman, nearly swept the election in East Pakistan and won 160 of the 162 
seats.  The League also secured an outright majority in Pakistan’s 300-seat National 
Assembly.  In West Pakistan, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s Pakistan Peoples Party managed to 
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win eighty-one seats using a politic campaign charged with populist rhetoric intended to 
mobilize Pakistan’s lower classes.88   
Before the new National Assembly convened, in which the Bengali Awami 
League would have possessed a outright majority, civil war broke out in East Pakistan.  
The Pakistan army’s brutal crackdown in 1971 resulted in millions of refugees flooding 
into India.  The Indian government, led by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, responded to 
the refugee influx with a military invasion of East Pakistan.  The Indian invasion was a 
hugely successful operation that resulted in a quick defeat and resulted in over 90,000 
Pakistani prisoners of war.  For Pakistan it was, “A disaster on a scale with the Arab 
defeat by Israel in the 1967 war,” concludes Gilles Kepel, expert on political Islam.89  In 
less than a decade, the Pakistani military had been defeated twice by Indian forces. 
The ethnic-centered Bengali nationalist movement had major implications for 
Pakistan’s claims to Kashmir.  Bengali nationalism directly challenged the foundations of 
the two-nation theory under which Pakistan was established.  Jinnah’s notion that South 
Asia’s Muslims must be united within one nation-state was dead.  Pakistan’s inability to 
effectively handle the ethnic divisions between East and West Pakistan exposed the 
weakness of its communal claim to Kashmir.  “At an ideological level,” asserts Sumit 
Ganguly, “Pakistan’s claim to Kashmir was effectively demolished.”90   
The 1971 defeat also had several immediate consequences for Pakistani society 
and government.  First of all, the performance of the Pakistani military in the war 
confirmed suspicions that the military’s professionalism and capabilities had declined due 
to years of politicization. 91  The military leadership implicitly acknowledged this 
conclusion and quickly began the process of extricating itself from politics.  Second, the 
military’s decline ended the era of secularization and westernization under military 
auspices.  The military was the standard bearer for secularism and westernization during 
the formative years of Pakistan’s development and its fall from grace left a political and 
ideological vacuum.  Third, the political space abandoned by the military was occupied 
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by parties advocating a socialist or Islamist future for Pakistan.  Bhutto’s success in the 
1970 elections running on a populist-socialist platform indicated that Pakistan still hung 
to the secular roots of the country planted by Mohammad Ali Jinnah, but the Islamist 
parties made significant inroads toward legitimizing the role of Islam in Pakistani society 
and government as well as expanding their power and influence during the 1970s. 
 
2. Expansion of Islamists’ Influence 
From Pakistan’s inception until the mid-1960s, the Islamist parties in Pakistan 
were mostly concerned with their  survival and preventing the mainly secular bureaucracy 
and military from secularizing Pakistani society.  The Islamist parties advocated a 
platform that sought the strict application of shariah (Islamic law) in Pakistan.  More 
importantly, their leaders claims to political authority based on their knowledge of Islam 
directly challenged the legitimacy of the largely westernized leadership.  During the latter 
half of the decade, however, Ayub’s government found common ground with the 
Islamists because of their common opposition to the Bhutto- led socialist movement.  
Still, the Islamist parties were unable to unify or broaden their platform and therefore 
could not expand beyond their traditional political base.  The three main Islamist parties,  
Jama’at- i Islami (JI), Jama’at- i Ulama-i Islam (JUI), Jama’at Ulama-i Pakistan (JUP), 
combined to win only 18 seats in the 1970 elections, all in West Pakistan.  The election 
results “dealt a severe blow to the morale of Jama’at members” concludes Vali Nasr.92  
But beyond the disappointing results, they did manage to collect over 20 percent of the 
vote93 and secured a position as an important political bloc in Pakistani politics.   
The rapidly deteriorating situation in East Pakistan provided an opportunity to 
revive the Islamist parties after the electoral set back.  Sayyed Abu’l-A’la Mawdudi, 
leader of the Jama’at-I Islami, the most influential Islamist party at the time, attempted to 
improve the nationalist credentials of Jama’at by mediating the dispute.94  The Jama’at 
leaders lobbied both Yahya Khan and Mujib Rahman to mend their differences, but both 
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refused to compromise.  As the situation worsened in East Pakistan, it became evident 
that the Awami League’s position threatened the survival of Pakistan as one nation.  In 
April 1971, “the Jama’at abandoned its role as intermediary and formed an unholy 
alliance with the Pakistan army.”95  The Jama’at decision was intended to provide the 
military religious legitimacy in its effort to hold the nation together. But, in the end, the 
Jama’at-miliary collaboration did little to address Bengali demands and Pakistan was 
bifurcated.  As a consequence of the Jama’at’s maneuver, the historically bitter 
relationship between the military and the Islamist was ended and the stage was set for 
future cooperation between the two. 
After the division of Pakistan, Bhutto, as leader of the PPP, became the prime 
minister of Pakistan.  Bhutto recognized the spreading popularity of the Islamist message 
and tried to woe the Islamist by co-opting their language.  In his effort to dominate the 
political discourse, Bhutto frequently talked of “Islamic socialism” during his speeches, 
and he proclaimed that “Islam is our faith, democracy is our polity, socialism is our 
economy.”96  In 1973 he promulgated Pakistan’s third constitution, which “has been 
described as the most Islamic Constitution in the history of Pakistan,”97 in which, he 
restored the word “Islamic” to Pakistan’s official name.  He also attempted to forge 
closer rela tionships with other Islamic states, especially those in the Middle East.  
Nevertheless, his efforts did not pacify the Islamist parties because they continued to 
regard him as “a rabid secularist” whose actions were disingenuous.  The Jama’at 
declared its opposition to Bhutto in December 1971 and continued to participate in anti-
Bhutto activities throughout his tenure.98 
Bhutto’s attempts to co-opt the Islamist agenda in fact had the opposite effect, and 
were crucial to legitimizing the Islamist parties and their demands, specifically the 
enforcement of shariah. 99  Bhutto’s appeals to Islam revealed the weakness of his 
position and his adoption of Islamist rhetoric and reforms revitalized the Islamist parties.  
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At the same time, he also alienated powerful segments of Pakistani society by promoting 
a socialist agenda, agitating ethnic tensions, and seeking to tame the military.100   
After several political setbacks in 1975 and 1976, Bhutto was convinced that a 
new round of elections were necessary.  A coalition of Islamist parties managed to form 
the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) to challenge the PPP at the polls.  As the election 
neared, the PPP became sufficiently worried and it resorted to kidnapping, intimidation, 
and poll rigging in order to ensure victory. 101  The PNA won only 36 seats compared to 
the PPP’s 155 of the 200-seat National Assembly. 
The PNA immediately denounced the elections as unfair and a conflagration of 
protests spread across Pakistan in 1977.  In a last ditch effort to mollify the Islamists, and 
a move that implicitly acknowledged their power; Bhutto announced an Islamization 
program that included a prohibition on night clubs, casinos, alcohol, and gambling.  The 
protests continued unabated.  Eventually, with no end to the impasse in sight and the 
country rapidly destabilizing, the military, led by General Zia ul-Haq, disposed of Bhutto 
in a military coup.102    
 
3. Foundation of U.S.-Pakistan Relationship Crumbles 
During the late 1960s and 1970s, the U.S. Pakistan relationship was overtaken by 
events and by 1979 had deteriorated considerably.  Initially, Ayub Khan was concerned 
with the military and economic aid the United States provided to India after its war with 
China in 1962.  The U.S. decision to halt aid to Pakistan during the 1965 Indo-Pakistan 
war severely damaged Pakistan’s perception of the U.S. commitment.  The decision also 
strengthened the case of those who advocated a tilt toward China and the Muslim world.  
Ayub’s commitment to the United States remained in place immediately following the 
1965 war, but the tension caused by Pakistan’s desire to improve relations with China 
increasingly weakened the U.S.-Pakistan partnership.     
Steadily, Ayub’s close ties to the United States came to be seen as a domestic 
political liability.  In an effort to distance himself from the alliance he was finding less 
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and less useful, in May 1968 he informed the U.S. government it no longer had access to 
the Badaber intelligence facility near Peshawar.103  By the time the Johnson 
administration left office the U.S.-Pakistan alliance had been fundamentally altered.  
Pakistan no longer considered the United States a reliable ally and the formerly close 
relationship became increasingly estranged. 
The realpolitik approach of the Nixon administration briefly slowed the alienation 
coming to define the relationship.  The Nixon administration correctly recognized the 
Sino-Soviet split and did not view Islamabad’s friendly relations with Beijing in the 
threatening light of previous American administrations.  In fact, Nixon and his National 
Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger, sought to exploit the Sino-Pakistan relationship and 
used it to facilitate the U.S. détente with China.  Even Zulfikar Ali Bhutto sought to 
improve relations with the United States after he became prime minister in 1971 after 
years of anti-American rhetoric. 
The rapprochement lasted beyond the Nixon administration and in 1975 the Ford 
administration lifted the arms embargo that the Johnson administration had put in place 
during the 1965 war.  Meanwhile, Indira Gandhi’s implementation of martial law in India 
and the military coup in Bangladesh that same year improved Pakistan’s appearance in 
comparison to its South Asian neighbors.  Uncharacteristically, Pakistan was more 
democratic than India for the first time in its existence. 
The ascendancy of the nuclear proliferation issue in the United States and 
Pakistan’s insistence on matching the Indian nuclear capability would ultimately 
undermine further improvements in the U.S.-Pakistan relationship.  In reality, the 
relationships recovery was superficial in nature and was no longer considered by either 
side to be fundamentally critical to their national security objectives.  To be sure, a 
positive relationship with the United States was still considered a pillar of Pakistan’s 
foreign policy, but the relationship’s importance was vastly outweighed by the priority 
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Pakistan put on its relations with China and other Muslim states, particularly Saudi 
Arabia and the Gulf oil states.104 
In 1976, the Ford administration, motivated by the imperatives of election year 
politics in the United States, set out with a heightened zeal to toughen up on Pakistan’s 
suspected nuclear program.  Having lost faith in the commitment of the United States, 
Pakistan was unwilling to halt its nuclear program.  The inauguration of the Carter 
administration marked the beginning of the descent toward the nadir in U.S.-Pakistan 
relations, according to Dennis Kux, author of several books on U.S.-South Asia 
relations.105  Carter ran on a platform emphasizing nuclear non-proliferation and human 
rights and Pakistan’s nuclear program and the deterioration of Pakistani politics leading 
to Zia’s military coup in 1977 cast Pakistan in an unfavorable light from the prospective 
of the new administration.  In January 1978, Carter visited India and ignominiously 
skipped Pakistan.  The following April, the United States suspended economic assistance 
to Pakistan because the Symington amendment to the U.S. Arms Export Control Act 
prohibited U.S. military and economic assistance to countries that did not sign the nuclear 
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT).106  When the U.S. embassy in Islamabad was burned to 
the ground in 1979, the relationship reached “its lowest point ever,” concludes Kux107 
 
D. PAKISTAN’S STRATEGY: DIPLOMACY AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS 
Two military defeats and the lost of Bengal significantly reduced the political 
power of the Pakistan military.  The events indicated that Pakistan’s foreign policy 
needed to be re-evaluated.  Most significantly, the belief that the Pakistan military could 
wrest Kashmir from India was dead.  Still, Bhutto’s rhetoric indicates that Pakistan 
remained determined to continue the struggle for Kashmir.  What changed was Pakistan’s 
understanding of how it could confront India.  Conventional military options were 
unviable.  Moreover, Pakistan’s relationship with the United States deteriorated so 
radically after the 1965 debacle that dependence on the United States was considered 
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foolish.  Therefore, during the 1970s, Pakistan’s Kashmir strategy reverted to pre-1965 
diplomatic measures.  Although the rhetorical attacks made by Bhutto can only loosely be 
categorized as a strategy, his decision to set Pakistan on a course to develop nuclear 
weapons in order to maintain some ability to challenge India indicates that Pakistan 
refused to accept Indian dominance and acquiesce to the status quo in Kashmir.  This was 
Pakistan’s first step toward asymmetric options in its effort to prevent India from 
dismissing its claims to Kashmir.  
After the Bangladesh war, Pakistan’s options in Kashmir were substantially 
circumscribed.  Pakistan’s weakness was demonstrated by Bhutto’s concession in the 
1972 Simla Accord, the agreement that ended the Bangladesh war.  In the Accord, the 
two nations “resolved to settle their differences by peaceful means through bilateral 
negotiations.”108  This was considered a major concession by Bhutto at the time because 
India had sought since 1949 to reduce the role of external actors in the dispute.  India  
believed that the United Nations had failed in 1949, and that the western powers, 
particularly the United States, were biased toward Pakistan because of India’s socialist 
policies and non-aligned movement leadership.  Therefore, Pakistani capitulation on this 
issue appeared to be a major victory for India.  There was even speculation that Bhutto 
and Gandhi had agreed to transform the newly named “line of control” (LoC) into a 
permanent border once Bhutto felt politically secure on the domestic front.109 
Still, despite the major concession Bhutto conceded at Simla, he refused to 
compromise on the status of Kashmir.  Instead, he continued to rhetorical agitate against 
India and he channeled the nation’s attention and resources on building the ultimate 
deterrent against Indian aggression—nuclear weapons. 
 
1. Maintaining Kashmir’s Disputed Status  
Bhutto had a number of reasons for reducing military tensions in Kashmir.  For 
one, two consecutive military defeats demoralized the military.  Pakistan was simply not 
capable of defeating India in a conventional battle.  Secondly, despite the military’s 
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decline it remained his primary political opponent and still dominated national security 
issues.  Therefore, Bhutto had little interest in aggravating a situation that would increase 
the role of the military.  On the other hand, Bhutto could not simply settle for the status 
quo.  Pakistan’s inability to free itself from its obsession with India and the resulting 
insecurity, has been so thoroughly cultivated in Pakistan, if Bhutto was suspected of 
having compromised on Kashmir it could have meant his political demise.110   
But while he moved to ease tensions on an issue the military dominated, Bhutto 
made sure the Pakistani public did not perceive him as capitulating on Kashmir.  He 
continued to condemn Indian aggression and used international forums to ensure that 
Kashmir remained “disputed” territory.  Contrary to allegations that he secretly agreed to 
convert the LoC into the international border, in his public statements he continued the 
struggle over Kashmir.  In fact, Prime Minister Bhutto’s 1973 article in the American 
foreign policy journal Foreign Affairs maintained Pakistan’s argument that India annexed 
Kashmir illegally.  Bhutto wrote: “India totally disregarded not only the principles on 
which partition had been effected but all norms of international conduct by sending her 
troops into Kashmir … Subsequently, India refused to allow the people of Kashmir to 
determine their future according to their own wishes.”111   
As for the war in 1971, which ostensibly discredited Pakistan’s claim to Kashmir, 
Bhutto asserted, “Pakistan had been the victim of unabashed aggression … it was but the 
climax of a long series of hostile and aggressive acts by India against Pakistan since the 
establishment of the two as sovereign and independent states.”112  The war and the 
subsequent independence of the Bengalis did not undermine the two-nation theory, rather 
it confirmed it from Pakistan’s perspective.  For Pakistan, the war verified India’s 
aggressive nature and reinforced Pakistan’s belief that Indian strategy in Kashmir was 
designed to discredit the founding principle of Pakistan all along.  Although Bhutto may 
have believed a military option was no longer viable, his continuation of the 
uncompromising rhetoric of previous Pakistani leaders illustrates that he was not 
preparing the Pakistani public for a compromise to the Kashmir solution.  In fact, the 
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second component of Bhutto’s strategy reveals that he had little intention of resolving 
issues with India. 
 
2. Nuclear Weapons  
The second element of Bhutto’s strategy was the development of nuclear weapons 
under civilian aegis.  Bhutto declared in 1965, “If India builds the bomb, we will eat 
grass […to] get one of our own.”113  Once he became prime minister in 1972, he 
jumpstarted the Pakistani nuclear program.  Four years later, he designated Abdul Qadeer 
Khan as head of the Pakistani nuclear program and had Khan report directly to him.114  
Bhutto understood “the discrepancy between Indian and Pakistani military capabilities 
[and] India’s power to protect its claim to Kashmir seemed insuperable.”115  By building 
a nuclear weapon Bhutto was hoping to negate India’s conventional military superiority 
while at the same time enhance his position vis-à-vis the military domestically.  
Additionally, the pursuit of nuclear weapons intended to ease the public’s unease brought 
on by the 1971 defeat. 
Bhutto’s strategy of rhetorical agitation and nuclear development were a logical 
outcome of both the domestic and strategic situation.  By focusing on diplomatic appeals, 
Bhutto necessarily reduced the role of the military.  Additionally, his decision to develop 
nuclear weapons under his direct guidance was similarly intended to diminish the role of 
the military while also defying the Indians in the eyes of the Pakistani public.  It was also 
reflective of the Pakistan’s belief that the United States was no t a county that it could 
count on in a crisis.  Pakistan’s nuclear program became the cornerstone of a national 
security strategy designed to neutralize India’s conventional advantages and “consistently 
ranked higher on Pakistan’s priority list than receiving economic aid and even military 
supplies,” concludes Teresita C. Schaffer, director of the South Asia program at The 
Center for Strategic and International Studies.116  Though the decision to develop nuclear 
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weapons was not seen as a way to wrest Kashmir from India, it does indicate that 
Pakistan continued to see India as a threat and that it would not capitulate to Indian 
attempts to dominate South Asia.  Bhutto’s daughter and future prime minister, Benazir, 
said as much two decades later, “[R]olling back the nuclear program is not feasible. … 
The nuclear program is linked with the Jammu and Kashmir issue.”117 
 
E. CONCLUSION 
Beginning in 1949, Pakistan’s Kashmir policy sought the self-determination for 
all of Kashmir and that the state was indivisible.  A policy that seeks a change in the 
status quo, and a position that India, especially after 1954, was unwilling to 
accommodate.  India’s legal claim to Kashmir, its effort to prove its secularism, as well 
as its desire to avoid setting a precedent in which a portion of the state was lost on the 
basis of communal grounds because of the numerous ethnic and religious groups that 
make up the nation, made it unwilling to cede territory to Pakistan.  Despite the distance 
between the two nations’ position, Pakistan pursued a peaceful settlement to the Kashmir 
dispute.  This strategy shifted in 1965. 
After 1954, cold war politics made India reluctant to even discuss the issue with 
Pakistan.  Nevertheless, Pakistan’s options were restricted because its military was poorly 
equipped and under funded.  Their effort to remedy this disadvantage led them to seek an 
alliance with the West.  Pakistan’s leaders understood that the continuation of the aid and 
assistance from the United States was dependent on their abstaining from the use of 
military force to achieve their aims in Kashmir.  The high importance Pakistan placed on 
obtaining military and economic assistance outweighed the desire to wrest Kashmir away 
from India.   
By 1965, the factors restraining Pakistani strategy were removed.  India’s 
declaration that Kashmir’s accession was “full final and complete,”118 Pakistan’s belief 
that it possessed the military advantage over India, and the deterioration of Pakistan’s 
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relationship with the United States resulted in Pakistan’s decision to shift from diplomacy 
to war. 
Although the 1965 operation did not unfold as Pakistan’s strategists may have 
hoped, it was not necessarily an illogical and irrational plan disconnected from the 
realities of the day.  In fact, Pakistan’s decision to abandon its diplomatic campaign was a 
response to changes in Pakistan’s position in relation to the external players and its 
accompanying reassessment of the external environment.  While the United States bears 
no responsibility for Pakistan’s decision to embark upon a war against its neighbors, the 
deterioration of the U.S.-Pakistan relationship played a vital role in Pakistan’s decision to 
shift its strategy in Kashmir. 
Finally, despite the setbacks of the 1965 and 1971 wars, Pakistan maintained the 
struggle for Kashmir.  Pakistan maintained its claims to Kashmir because internal politics 
made it difficult to abandon the issue.  This indicates that Pakistan’s policy on Kashmir 
continues to be a function of mostly internal politics.  On the other hand, Pakistan’s 
strategy is impacted by both internal and external factors, as these shifted, so did its 















IV. PROXY WAR 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
Despite the disastrous outcome of the 1971 war, Pakistan maintained its position 
that Kashmir was disputed territory and that its status should be determined by the will of 
the Kashmir people through a plebiscite.  Recognizing the constraints of the external 
environment, it shifted to a strategy of diplomacy to preserve Kashmir’s disputed status.  
This strategy lasted until the early 1990s when Pakistan’s shifted its strategy again, and it 
began to support an insurgency in Kashmir on an unprecedented scale.   
Although India had accused Pakistan of supporting insurgency in Kashmir since 
1948, until 1990 there had been only two prior cases of substantial Pakistani support to 
insurgency efforts in Kashmir.119  The first occurred in 1948 when the nascent Pakistan 
army assisted the tribesmen from the Northwest Frontier. This assistance was unplanned 
and implemented in an unsystematic and decentralized manner.  The second occasion 
was prior to the conventional military operation in 1965 and was intended to prepare 
Kashmir for that follow-on conventional assault.  In contrast, the proxy war strategy that 
Pakistan launched in the early 1990s was comprehensive, organized, and intended to be 
long-term.  Moreover, it was not planned as part of a conventional military operation.  
This chapter examines why Pakistan’s strategy shifted when it did, why a proxy war 
strategy was chosen over other options, the reasons for and consequences of the Kargil 
operation, and how the changes induced by the 11 September 2001 attacks have impacted 
Pakistan’s strategy in Kashmir. 
There are two elements of Pakistan’s decision to launch a proxy war.  The first 
element is internal.  Political shifts during the 1970s brought about an alliance between 
Islamists and the military that were reinforced and deepened during the Afghan war.  The 
most important consequence of this relationship was that it created a powerful coalition 
that not only believed proxy war was an effective instrument but that also profited from 
the implementation of a proxy war.  The second element is external and explains why 
Pakistan’s strategy shifted when it did.  The indigenously-sparked Kashmiri rebellion that 
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started in 1989 indicated that India had been unable to successfully integrate Kashmir 
into its political system and created an opportunity for Pakistan to more forcefully pursue 
its objectives in Kashmir.  A second external factor that influenced the shift in strategy 
was the decline in U.S.-Pakistan relations in 1990.  It is difficult to determine the extent 
U.S. sanctions had an effect on Pakistan’s Kashmir strategy, but it is not unreasonable to 
conclude that the U.S. decision to withdrawal from South Asia and impose sanctions on 
Pakistan removed any remaining constraints on Pakistan’s decision to engage in proxy 
war in Kashmir. 
The second half of this chapter discusses the reasons and consequences of the 
Kargil conflict and the impact of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks.  India’s 
response to the Kargil intrusion made it clear to Pakistan that attempts to substantially 
alter the LoC would not be tolerated even with the threat of nuclear war.  However, the 
conflict does not appear to have impacted Pakistan’s calculation that the proxy war 
strategy continued to be the most effective method of pursuing its objectives in Kashmir. 
On the other hand, the geopolitical impact of the U.S. war on terror has already 
resulted in a number of changes that have forced Pakistan to reconsider its support for the 
militants in Kashmir.  Most significantly, Pakistan appears to have come to the 
realization that the use of militant proxies runs the risk of putting national interests of 
higher priority at risk. 
 
B. TOWARD PROXY WAR 
When diplomacy failed to convince India to discuss the Kashmir issue in 1965, 
instead of initiating a proxy war, Pakistan launched a military operation.  The results of 
the 1965 and 1971 wars demonstrated to Pakistan’s leaders that conventional military 
options were unviable.  According to the former director of arms control and 
disarmament affairs in Pakistan’s Strategic Plans Division of Joint Services 
Headquarters, Brigadier General Feroz Hassan Khan, it was Pakistan’s “twin losses to 
India in 1965 and 1971 [that] pushed it down the nuclear path.”120  India’s ability to 
broaden any war beyond the Line of Control inherently put Pakistan at a disadvantage 
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because its major cities were concentrated along its border with India and therefore 
vulnerable to Indian attack.  The threat of escalation was India’s ace in the hole.  In light 
of this situation, Pakistan turned toward a strategy that focused on maintaining Kashmir’s 
disputed status while also developing nuclear weapons. 
Pakistan’s lack of a proxy war strategy was not due to an absence of Kashmiri 
insurgents.  Actually, Kashmiri insurgent groups began to emerge as early as 1965, but 
were given little support by the Pakistani government because they sought independence 
for Kashmir, an option no Pakistani leader truly championed.121  Inspired by the 
Vietnamese war against the United States and the Algerian insurgency against the 
French, Kashmiris living in Azad Kashmir, formed the Jammu and Kashmir National 
Liberation Front (JKNLF).122  Through most of the 1970s and 1980s JKNLF activities 
were generally no more than an irritant to India because they never received sufficient 
support from the Pakistani government.  The limited support the Pakistani government 
gave to the indigenous Kashmiri resistance groups in the late 1960s and 1970s 
demonstrated Pakistan’s desire to maintain control over the Kashmir dispute.  Indeed, 
supporting the insurgency might have cost the Pakistani government little in comparison 
to its pursuit of nuclear weapons.  But, the pursuit of nuclear weapons was sold as a 
panacea to a Pakistani public dejected by the 1971 disaster, and was intended to show 
that the government was continuing to challenge Indian hegemony. 
In addition to Pakistan’s reluctance to provide much assistance to groups that 
ultimately sought independence, the limited assistance Pakistan provided was due to the 
fact that the proxy war strategy lacked both a constituency and the necessary 
infrastructure for implementation.  By 1989, however, Zia’s Islamization program and the 
Afghan war produced a powerful coalition between the military, the Inter-Service 
Intelligence Directorate (ISI), and several Islamist organizations.  The development of 
this coalition and the impact it had on perceptions was critical to the Pakistani 
government’s attitudes toward proxy war, especially a proxy war coordinated with 
Islamic militants.   
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While this coalition opened up new possibilities for Pakistan, alone it was 
unlikely to have resulted in a shift in Pakistan’s strategy in Kashmir.  A shift in strategy 
required a major change in the external environment.  In this case, Pakistan’s shift was 
made possible by the conflagration of Kashmiri resistance that swept the Kashmir Valley 
in 1989.  The rebellion instilled hope among Pakistan’s leaders that Kashmir was not a 
lost caused and they intended to capitalize on the opportunity.   
 
1. Consolidation of the Military-Islamist Coalition 
When General Zia ul-Haq deposed Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in April 
1977 he justified the military’s intervention into Pakistan’s politics on the grounds that 
the military had to save the country from the degeneration of the political process and the 
instability caused by Bhutto’s mismanagement.123  However, the growth of Islamist 
parties’ influence during the 1970s meant Zia could not maintain military rule on the 
same premise as Ayub Khan.  Bhutto’s appeals to Islam and his twelfth-hour attempt to 
implement an Islamization program had revealed the strength of the Islamist parties in 
Pakistan, and with his demise they expected to inherit control over the government.124 
Regardless of the Islamists’ expectations, Zia was unwilling to cede power to an 
ideology the military establishment considered a threat to Pakistan’s political stability 
and long-term interests.125  Even with the military’s disappointment with the U.S. 
decision to halt aid in 1965, it still leaned toward the West and it knew the Islamist 
parties intended to curtail this relationship.  Moreover, during Pakistan’s first two 
decades of independence, the Islamist organizations had been considered a thorn in the 
side of military rule.126   
Nevertheless, once Zia decided to postpone the return to civilian rule, he needed 
to establish some semblance of legitimacy beyond the necessity to stabilize the country.  
To accomplish this, Zia set out to co-opt the Islamist organizations by promoting a policy 
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of Islamization and promoting Jama’at members and their allies to ministerial 
positions.127  Bhutto had made similar concessions late in his term, but Zia, unlike 
Bhutto, was generally regarded as a pious Muslim by the Islamist parties and therefore 
they considered his efforts genuine.  The Islamists also found Zia’s argument that early 
elections would mostly benefit the PPP under the current conditions persuasive.128  
Therefore, the Jama’at and its allies formed a partnership with Zia. 
Zia’s relationship with the Islamist organizations was not a partnership of equals.  
Zia intended to use Islam to perpetuate the rule of the military hierarchy.  “For General, 
Zia, the promotion of Mawdudi and his disciples was a way to block the restoration of 
democracy and justify martial law by presenting it as a vehicle for setting up a true 
Islamic state,”129 concludes Gilles Kepel.  The Jama’at realized that it was the junior 
partner in the deal, but continued the partnership because of its access to previously 
unavailable perquisites and patronage.  Senior leaders of the Jama’at were treated as elder 
statesmen by the Zia regime, and the educational, military, and bureaucratic institutions 
were opened up to them like no other time in Pakistan’s history. 130   
Penetration into these institutions allowed the Islamist to influence the Pakistan’s 
decision-making process at unparalleled levels.  Yet, Zia retained his position of 
advantage by employing divide and rule tactics with the Islamist organizations.  Once he 
had persuaded the Jama’at to support him in his Islamization program he cultivated 
relationships with its Islamist rivals.131  After the Soviet’s invaded Afghanistan the levels 
of patronage available to the Islamist and the incentives for the military and the Islamists 
to cooperate more extensively were strengthened and broadened. 
 
2. Establishment of the Jihad Constituency and Infrastructure  
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 was both a threat and an 
opportunity for Pakistan.  With the Soviets pressing menacingly against Pakistan’s 
                                                 
127 Kepel, Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam, 100. 
128 Nasr,  Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution, 190. 
129 Kepel, Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam, 101. 
130 Nasr,  Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution, 195. 
131 Ibid, 193. 
62 
western border and with India on its east, Pakistan had hostile governments on both sides. 
Pakistan was still struggling with the consequences of the East Pakistan’s secession and 
the political changes sweeping, and had only recently quelled a rebellion in Baluchistan.  
Meanwhile, the United States was still stinging from its failure in Vietnam, the Iran 
hostage crisis made the Carter administration seem hapless, and the U.S.-Pakistan 
relationship had substantially worsened during the late 1970s over U.S. nonproliferation 
concerns.   
Nevertheless, both countries immediately understood that their interests had 
converged once again.  The Carter administration realized that challenging the Soviets in 
Afghanistan was a higher national security priority than maintaining sanctions against 
Pakistan for its nuclear program and presented an aid package to Zia.  Zia recognized 
Pakistan’s improved bargaining position and dismissed Carter’s four hundred million 
dollar aid offer as “peanuts.”  However, the incoming Reagan administration put together 
an assistance package that solidified U.S-Pakistan cooperation against the Soviets in 
Afghanistan. 
Since neither the United States nor Pakistan wanted to directly confront the 
Soviets in Afghanistan, the Reagan administration and the Zia government agreed to 
cooperate in a proxy war against the Soviets.  Under the terms of the deal, the United 
States provided money, weapons, and training to Pakistan, which Pakistan used to arm, 
fund, and train the various mujahedin factions engaging the Soviets.  The strategy proved 
to be effective and the Soviets completed the withdrawal of their forces in February 1989.  
But, the proxy war strategy had repercussions on Pakistan’s institutions, politics, and 
society that laid the foundation for another shift in Pakistan’s strategy in Kashmir.  
The Afghan war allowed the Pakistan military to re-asserted itself as the dominant 
force in Pakistan’s politics, economy, and society.  Zia’s handling of the Soviet invasion 
of Afghanistan and Pakistan’s rising stature in international affairs bolstered the 
military’s status.  Any influence it had lost after the 1965 and 1971 wars was regained.  
Consequently, during this period the military consolidated its control over Pakistan’s 
foreign policy and many of its bureaucracies.   
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Additionally, ISI’s expanded its power in Pakistan’s national security affairs as a 
result of the clandestine nature of the U.S. aid and ISI’s exclusive management of the 
distribution of that aid.132  As the link between the Pakistani government and the 
mujahedin, ISI managed enormous amounts of money and weapons.  Once resources 
from the United States, Saudi Arabia, and other donors arrived in Pakistan, ISI managed 
the distribution of these resources to the various mujahedin groups and their associated 
Pakistani Islamist parties.  Its management of the resistance groups gave it substantial 
leverage within Pakistan’s decision-making establishment and made it a major player in 
Pakistan’s national security apparatus. 
There were several reasons why ISI chose religiously-oriented, fundamentalist 
organizations.  First of all, military-Islamist connections had been established in the early 
1970s in response to the coup in 1973 that brought the Daoud government to power in 
Afghanistan. 133  Second, an ideological affinity existed between Zia and the religious 
resistance groups.  Third, as a mujahedin commander interviewed in 1992 observed, “The 
CIA and Pakistan funded the fundamentalists because they figured that those groups were 
least likely to compromise with the regime.”134 
As a result of this direct interaction with the Islamists, ISI’s ties to fundamentalist 
organizations produced extensive linkages that resulted in a convergence of their 
respective interests.  The Islamists and ISI both recognized that their increased influence 
was largely due to their roles in conflicts that used insurgency methods and required a 
degree of plausible deniability for the Pakistan government. 
In addition to the political access, money, and weapons that the Islamists received 
because of their role in the Afghan war, the conflict also increased Islamists’ influence in 
society.  Even the terms used to describe the struggle and those that fought it, jihad and 
mujahiden, “gave a boost to the revival of Islamic sentiments among the religious groups 
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in Pakistan,” notes Saeed Shafqat, Pakistani author and professor.135  By portraying the 
conflict in Afghanistan as a jihad sanctioned by the tenets of Islam, the Islamist parties, 
which had typically performed poorly in elections, were able to mobilize support for their 
activities by tapping into an emotionally charged issue that nearly all Pakistanis 
supported.  Additional influence was garnered by the Islamist parties because of their 
unequaled liberty to hold political rallies and conduct political activities at universities, 
labor unions, and other organizations.  During the 1980s, both funding and recruiting 
improved dramatically for the Islamist parties. 136   Furthermore, Saudi petrodollars 
funded the establishments of thousands of madrassas that espoused a strict, austere, 
missionary message.  This allowed the Islamists parties to enlarge their constituency by 
steadily churning out an army of individuals that supported their agenda of jihad and 
Islamization. 
The Islamists’ alliance with Zia’s military regime, their ties to ISI, their role in 
sanctioning the conflict in Afghanistan, and their role in the actual conflict all contributed 
to a rise in the levels of militancy and fundamentalism in Pakistan.  Nevertheless, 
Pakistan’s proxy war in Kashmir was not launched because the military had become 
more militant or that the government was determined to divert militants away from 
Pakistan because they could destabilize the nation.  Although the militants could have 
presented a problem, it is unlikely that their return was the primary reason Pakistan 
shifted to a proxy war.  In fact, Pakistan began supporting the proxy war before the end 
of the war in Afghanistan in 1992.  Furthermore, the total membership of the most 
ruthless organizations was relatively small.  According to Jane’s Intelligence Review, in 
1999 Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) consisted of only 300 individuals, Hizbul Mujahedin (HM) 
had 500-800, and Harkat-ul-Ansar, later Harkat-ul-Mujahedin (HUM) was composed of 
350.137  Although such numbers could cause problems for Pakistan, they did not present 
an existential threat to the state of Pakistan.  Finally, in 1990, militants associated with 
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the war in Afghanistan were not perceived to be the threat they are today and it is 
unlikely that it was considered vital to the state of Pakistan to divert them to Kashmir. 
In the end, the Afghan War did contribute to the growth of militancy in Pakistan, 
but the more important consequences of Pakistan’s war in Afghanistan was that a 
powerful coalition formed that benefited from proxy war, an infrastructure to implement 
a proxy war strategy was developed, and the advantages of a proxy war strategy seemed 
apparent.  The success of the insurgency in Afghanistan made the proxy war option 
highly attractive.  Pakistan was essentially able to wage war against the Soviets without 
having to bear the brunt of a conventional war.  Still, Pakistan’s shift in strategy required 
major changes in the external environment. 
 
3. Kashmir Rebellion 
In addition to the internal changes in Pakistan, the event that was critical to 
Pakistan’s strategy shift was the indigenous Kashmiri rebellion that engulfed the state in 
1989 and 1990.  Without the rebellion it is unlikely that Pakistan’s strategy in Kashmir 
would have changed in any substantial way for three reasons.  First of all, previous 
attempts to stir up dissatisfaction, particularly Operation GIBRALTAR, were received 
warily by Kashmiris.  Without evidence that Kashmiris were dissatisfied with rule from 
New Delhi and willing to challenge it, a proxy war strategy had little chance of 
succeeding.  Second, the group leading the resistance against New Delhi was the JKLF 
(formerly JKNLF), which Pakistan had provided only limited support in its effort to 
maintain the struggle in Kashmir.  The JKLF’s pro- independence platform was 
considered a risk and Pakistan did not intend to allow the organization to lead the 
struggle.138  Third, Pakistan was aware that the initiation of a proxy war strategy in 
Kashmir while receiving billions of dollars of U.S. aid was likely to irritate Washington.  
If the United States was forced to deal with Indian accusations that its aid dollars were 
supporting a proxy war in Kashmir, it could have presented problems for Pakistan’s more 
immediate objectives in Afghanistan.  But shortly after the outbreak of the Kashmir 
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rebellion the U.S.-Pakistan relationship would take a turn for the worse and this would no 
longer be a constraint on Pakistan’s strategy.  
Pakistan’s behavior indicates that an external catalyst was necessary to produce a 
shift in strategy.  By the mid-1980s the support within the government and the capability 
to assist insurgency operations in Kashmir existed and although the U.S. aid was not 
supposed to be used there, enormous amounts of arms and money had leaked into 
Pakistani society and could easily have been diverted to Kashmir.  Yet, even as late as the 
mid-1980s when the political situation in Kashmir began to deteriorate and “charges of 
Pakistani involvement were openly bandied about by Congress leaders … there was no 
Pakistani hand visible in the valley at all.”139  Indeed, throughout the 1980s while the 
changes described in the previous section occurred within Pakistan, Pakistan’s strategy in 
Kashmir remained unchanged.  Zia’s strategy, like Bhutto’s, focused on maintaining 
Kashmir’s disputed status while at the same time continuing the development of nuclear 
weapons.  Zia even attempted to defuse tensions with India.  In the early 1980s, he 
offered a no-war pact to India, as well as the establishment of a nuclear- free zone.140  
Though the proposals were nearly identical to offers once made by Nehru, the India 
government rebuffed them because they were perceived as propaganda ploys intended to 
improve Zia’s image in the eyes of Washington.  Zia’s “peace offensive” launched in late 
1985, was received with similar skepticism by India.141  In fact, when the Kashmir 
rebellion caught fire in 1989 “Pakistan seemed to be taken unaware” by the intensity of 
Kashmiri resistance and appeared to have no plans in place to take advantage of such a 
contingency. 142   
 
4. U.S.-Pakistan Relations: From Partnership to Punishment 
The drift in U.S-Pakistan relations began in the early 1960s when Pakistan sought 
a closer relationship with China and the Kennedy administration tried to mend relations 
with India.  By 1965, the interests of the United States and Pakistan had diverged 
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sufficiently enough that the relationship languished.  Nixon and Kissinger improved U.S.-
Pakistan relations, but the fragility of the relationship was exposed during the late 1970s.  
From the U.S. perspective, Pakistan’s pursuit of a nuclear weapons program was the most 
formidable obstacle in the way of improved relations.  Leaders in Pakistan, however, 
never quite grasped the importance of the issue in the United States.  On the other hand, 
the United States did not understand that Pakistan no longer considered U.S. security 
commitments as credible and was unwilling to sacrifice its nuclear program in exchange 
for unreliable and conditional U.S. economic and military assistance.  These two 
irreconcilable perspectives were put aside when the immedia te challenge of the Soviets in 
Afghanistan rose to the forefront of both nations’ security concerns, but they would 
quickly resurface when the threat dissipated.  The percolating tension over the nuclear 
issue would ultimately boil over in 1990 and, similar to events in the early 1960s, the 
disintegration of U.S.-Pakistan relations would correspond to a Pakistani decision to shift 
its strategy in Kashmir.  
When the Reagan administration brought to the table a $3 billion aid-package and 
an F-16 deal in 1981, the United States secured Pakistan’s cooperation in the struggle 
against the Soviets in Afghanistan.  There was broad political support in both the United 
States and Pakistan for the joint effort to dislodge the Soviets from Afghanistan.  But 
despite the convergence of strategic interests, powerful individuals in the U.S. Congress 
continued to press the Reagan administration on Pakistan’s suspected nuclear weapons 
program.  In late 1984, concerns began to mount within the United States that Pakistan’s 
nuclear weapons program was continuing unabated and the only thing the certification 
process mandated under the Symington Amendment did was prevent Pakistan from 
actually exploding a bomb.  During the 1986 debate over the Reagan administration’s 
proposal to secure another six year package for Pakistan worth $4 billion, Senator John 
Glenn (D-Ohio), who had been an indefatigable advocate for the non-proliferation cause, 
proposed an amendment to the U.S. foreign assistance act that would require the 
president to certify that Pakistan was not developing a nuclear weapon in addition to not 
possessing one.143 
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The Reagan administration offered an alternative proposal that would require the 
president to annually certify that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear weapon.  The  
resultant Pressler Amendment seemed innocuous enough at the time since most U.S. 
assessments did not think that Pakistan was near a nuclear weapons capability.  For the 
next three years, Reagan was able to certify to Congress that Pakistan did not possess a 
nuclear weapon.  Nevertheless, the Reagan and Bush administrations grew increasingly 
concerned, continually warning Pakistan’s leaders that if it became evident that Pakistan 
possessed a nuclear weapon the president’s hands were tied—U.S aid would be ha lted 
and there was little the president could do.  Despite the warnings however, Pakistan’s 
leadership did not believe the Americans would actually implement sanctions and they 
continued with their nuclear development program. 144 
In May 1990, George Bush’s deputy national security advisor, Robert Gates, 
made a trip to South Asia.  Gates informed his Pakistani hosts that the United States had 
come to the conclusion that Pakistan did in fact possess a nuclear weapon.  Pakistan 
denied the charge.145  In October 1990, President Bush was unable to certify that 
Pakistan did not possess a nuclear weapon and U.S. military aid to Pakistan was frozen.  
Economic assistance already designated for disbursement was allowed to flow, but when 
that aid ran out, U.S. assistance was finished. 
Pakistan’s response to the sanctions was characterized by disbelief, shock, and 
anger.146  From Pakistan’s perspective, the U.S. action was representative of the 
disloyalty typical of the United States.  The fact that Pakistan had ignored U.S. warnings 
was irrelevant, Pakistan maintained, because the United States was aware throughout the 
1980s that Pakistan had a nuclear weapon and had managed to find ways to avoid 
sanctions until the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan. 
The serious setback in relations alone is unlikely to have caused Pakistan to 
launch a proxy war.  If that were the case, then Pakistan would have embarked on a proxy 
war in 1978 after U.S. economic assistance was halted in accordance with the Symington 
amendment.  On the other hand, the imposition of sanctions in the fall of 1990 eliminated 
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any constraints Pakistan may have felt because of its relationship with the United States. 
The U.S. abandonment of its relations with Pakistan, and the subsequent attempt by the 
Clinton administration to foster better relations with India after it began to reform its 
markets in 1991, was déjà vu for Pakistani leaders familiar with the deterioration of U.S.-
Pakistan relations in the early 1960s.  The bottom line was that U.S.-Pakistan relations 
took a U-turn and the decline of the U.S.-Pakistan partnership coincides with a another 
major shift in Pakistan’s strategy. 
 
C. PROXY WAR STRATEGY 
Shortly after the rebellion began in Kashmir, Pakistan began to provide weapons, 
training, and assistance to insurgents infiltrating across the Line of Control into Indian-
controlled Kashmir.147  These activities were done in combination with efforts to use 
international fora to highlight the Kashmir issue.  Pakistan’s strategy had several 
objectives.  First, to make it extremely difficult for India to dismiss Pakistan’s claims to 
Kashmir.  Second, to steadily erode India’s will and force it back to the negotiating table, 
where Pakistan could negotiate a more favorable outcome.  Third, at a minimum, to tie 
down Indian forces in Kashmir.148  In addition, the proxy war strategy had the added 
advantage that it provided Pakistan with plausible deniability and made the possibility of 
Indian retaliation against Pakistan more problematic. 
A full understanding of the scale of Pakistan’s support to the insurgents is 
unknown due to Pakistan’s refusal to officially acknowledge that it provides anything 
more than moral and political support.  However, Robert Wirsing concluded in his 1994 
assessment of the conflict that “the infiltration has been necessarily a Pakistan-directed 
operation,” and, “it most certainly has not been, as Pakistani civil and military officials 
continue to claim, a largely spontaneous affair (italics in original).”149  The United States 
government acknowledged at least tacit support on the part of the Pakistani government 
in the 2000 State Department annual report on terrorism, Patterns of Global 
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Terrorism.150  The report stated that the Musharraf government “continued previous 
Pakistani Government support of the Kashmir insurgency, and Kashmiri militant groups 
continued to operate in Pakistan, raising funds and recruiting new cadre.  Several of these 
groups were responsible for attacks against civilians in Indian-held Kashmir.”  The report 
noted that the Harakat ul-Mujahedin (HUM), a group designated by the United States as a 
foreign terrorist organization, “continues to be active in Pakistan without discouragement 
of the Government of Pakistan.”  Beyond merely tacit support, a September 2001 RAND 
article concluded that Pakistan’s assistance included training and logistical, financial, and 
doctrinal support to the insurgents.151  The article found that there were at least 91 
training camps where training provided by the Pakistan military included such topics as 
weapons handling, demolitions, urban sabotage, and escape and evasion techniques.  
According to the article, the Indian Research and Analysis Wing estimated the annual 
financial support provided to the militants in the range of $125—250 million a year.  The 
result of Pakistan’s official support was to “dramatically heightened the firepower and 
overall proficiency of the militants on the ground.”152  In terms of the actual infiltration 
of the militants across the LoC, Pakistan’s had at least some role.  According to Brigadier 
Sayed Hassan Abbas Rizvi, a Pakistani army officer interviewed in 1990, “If my troops 
see these poor chaps (Kashmiri militants crossing to Pakistan) being butchered in front of 
us.  I do not try to stop them from firing.”153 
The proxy war in Kashmir continued throughout the 1990s and appeared to 
achieve its desired effect.  India’s efforts to cope with the insurgency frequently resulted 
in the excessive use of force and human rights abuses that provided Pakistan’s diplomats 
further evidence to buttress Pakistan’s claims at international fora.  Moreover, the proxy 
war strategy cost India lives and treasure.  In its efforts to battle the insurgency India was 
forced to increase the number of Border Security Forces ten-fold between 1989 and 1993.  
By mid-1993, the number of Indian army and paramilitary troops was estimated to be 
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between 300,000 and 400,000.154  Most importantly for Pakistan, it made India’s claims 
that Kashmir was not an issue appear incongruent with reality. 
Although Pakistan’s strategy appeared to be working as planned, it had several 
important consequences for Pakistan’s institutions, its decision-making, and the nature of 
the dispute.  The following section addresses these consequences.  Additionally, it looks 
at the role of militancy in Pakistan’s proxy war.  
 
1. The Consequences of the Proxy War Strategy 
Pakistan’s proxy war strategy gave the ISI and the Pakistani military significantly 
more influence in the government’s decision-making process, particularly with respect to 
Kashmir and Afghanistan.  The clandestine nature of the strategy resulted in a large 
number of decisions made by a small segment of Pakistan’s government.  ISI’s near 
monopoly of information provided it with additional leverage over decision-makers 
because they supplied the information that shaped the decision-making debate.155   
The political disarray that characterized Pakistani politics after Zia’s death also 
contributed to the military’s autonomy in Kashmir.  Under Zia’s regime the position of 
prime minister was emasculated.  Pakistan’s Eighth Amendment gave the president the 
authority to dismiss the prime minister, and the power was used liberally by Presidents 
Ghulam Ishaq Khan and Farooq Leghari.  Ishaq Khan, who served as president from 
1988 to 1993, dismissed Bhutto two years into her first term and then sacked her 
successor, Nawaz Sharif, two and a half years after he replaced Bhutto.  Farooq Leghari, 
Bhutto’s hand-picked choice for president and president from 1993 until 1998, turned on 
Bhutto in 1996 and dumped her three years into her second stint.  The weakness of the 
prime minister reinforced the institutional imbalances in Pakistan’s political system that, 
as discussed in Chapter II, have been present in Pakistan since its independence.  It also 
contributed to the attitude amongst the military that Pakistan’s national security affairs 
could not be left in the hands of the politicians.  As a result of the proxy war strategy and 
Pakistan’s internal political disorder, the civilian leadership became heavily dependent on 
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the military and the ISI for information and advice.  This arrangement essentially allowed 
the military and ISI to conduct Pakistan’s affairs in Afghanistan and Kashmir almost 
independently.156 
Nevertheless, Pakistan’s proxy war strategy was not a rogue operation.  Benazir 
Bhutto’s declared that Pakistan would fight “a 1,000 year war” against India in Kashmir 
and her trip to Muzzaffarabad in February 1990 and her subsequent announcement that 
Kashmir’s only option was accession to Pakistan indicate that the prime minister not only 
supported the effort she was involved in the decision-making process.157  Her decision to 
shift Pakistani support to the Taliban in 1994 demonstrates that in addition to being aware 
of Pakistan’s clandestine activities she possessed the ability to alter and redirect a 
particular strategy. 
A second consequence of a proxy war strategy coordinated with Islamists and 
militants is that it began to impact the rhetoric Pakistan used to defend its claims to 
Kashmir.  From its beginnings Pakistan justified its struggle in Kashmir in terms of self-
determination and national liberation, but the role of the Islamists and the militants in the 
last decade caused many to talk in terms of a jihad in Kashmir.158  In a dynamic similar 
to the war in Afghanistan, the use of Islamist language benefitted the Islamist 
organizations in Pakistan and may make it more difficult for Pakistan’s leaders to be 
pragmatic in the Kashmir dispute. 
 
2. The Role of Militancy in Pakistan’s Strategy 
Although militancy and the Islamists’ influence on society and government grew 
during the 1980s, Pakistan’s swift decision to aid the insurgency in Kashmir was not 
because Pakistan’s leaders had been infected with militancy or were concerned with an 
Islamic militant backlash.  The decision to support the insurgency was based on broad 
support across the political spectrum that included not only Islamist organization and the 
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military, but also Western-educated politicians, such as Benazir Bhutto.  In fact, when 
Bhutto was re-elected to her second term in October 1993, the Islamist parties combined 
to win only six of the two hundred and seven National Assembly seats and were said to 
be on the decline.159  Also, as discussed above, Pakistan’s support for the insurgency 
began prior to the influx of militants returning from Afghanistan.   
Pakistan realized the Kashmiri rebellion presented a major opportunity to press its 
claims to Kashmir and quickly made the decision to support the insurgency.  Still, 
Pakistan sought ways to control the direction of the insurgency, even if that meant 
cracking down on pro- independence Kashmir forces.  Because Pakistan intended to 
control the direction of the insurgency and any eventual outcome, non-Kashmiri militant 
organizations with roots in Afghanistan would come to play a major role in the strategy.   
Pakistan acted quickly to squelch talk of Kashmiri independence because it 
realized that a free and independent Kashmir could cost them Azad Kashmir as well as 
the Northern Areas.  In February 1990 after a trip to Muzzaffarabad, a town in Azad 
Kashmir where many of the Kashmiri groups are headquartered, Prime Minister Benazir 
Bhutto made Pakistan’s position clear when she announced at a press conference that 
Kashmir’s only option was accession to Pakistan. 160  Then, in 1991 and 1992, the 
Pakistani government clashed with the JKLF over the organization’s attempts to march 
across the LoC.  In the 1992 incident, the organization’s refusal to heed Prime Minister 
Nawaz Sharif’s order to desist resulted in at least twelve deaths when Pakistani 
government forces fired onto the marchers.161 
The collapse of the Najibullah government in Afghanistan changed the face of the 
Kashmir conflict because it allowed Pakistan to shift its support away from the JKLF and 
to militant groups that had established relationships with the ISI.  The end of the jihad 
against the communist in Afghanistan freed up significant resources and personnel that 
were then redirected to Kashmir.  In 1993, Lashkar-e-Toiba, a fiercely militant group 
with roots in Afghanistan and a reputation for ruthlessness, emerged in Kashmir.162   
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Like the Hizbul Mujahedin (HM), the LeT is dominated by non-Kashmiris and was pro-
Pakistan.  By the end of 1993, the Kashmir insurgency was dominated by pro-Pakistan 
organizations that were composed predominantly of militants from Pakistan, 
Afghanistan, and Arab states.163  The Pakistani government believed that the influx of 
these groups into the Kashmir conflict would give it greater control over the direction of 
the insurgency. 
 
D. KARGIL AND THE POST-11 SEPTEMBER ENVIRONMENT  
Although the proxy war strategy served a number of Pakistani interests, the 
Kashmiri insurgency began to wane in the late 1990s.  Pakistan’s decision to depend on 
non-Kashmiri militants caused Kashmiri support for the insurgency to erode because the 
militants managed to alienate many Kashmiris with their ruthlessness.  Meanwhile, 
India’s more aggressive counter- insurgency tactics began to produce results.164  In early 
1999, Pakistan designed an operation that was expected to re-energize the insurgency.  
This section discusses that operation and its consequences, in addition to the impact of 
the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks. 
 
1. Kargil 
In May 1999, India discovered that a large number of intruders had infiltrated 
across the LoC in the Kargil region of Kashmir and had ensconced themselves into highly 
defensible positions that allowed them to directly target the road from Srinagar to Leh.  
The road was significant because it was the only land route which the Indians could use 
to re-supply its troops at the Siachen Glacier where a low-intensity battle had smoldered 
between India and Pakistan since 1984.  Once India’s leaders came to a full 
understanding of the size of the intrusion and its tactical significance, India set out to 
retake the nearly 40 square miles of land that had been occupied.  After adjusting to 
initial setbacks and revising their tactics, Indian forces were able to combine the use of 
air and artillery to enable its troops to retake two key positions.  With the tide of the 
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battle turning, Pakistan’s Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif sought relief in Washington.  
Instead, he was pressured by President Bill Clinton to order a complete withdrawal.  
Sharif complied and ordered a withdrawal of the “mujahedin” on 12 July. 
In the wake of Pakistan’s excursion into the Kargil region of Kashmir in 1999, a 
number of observers began to question the decision-making of Pakistan’s leadership.165  
While tactically sound, the timing of the operation appeared incoherent.  Less than a year 
earlier, Pakistan and India had both tested nuclear weapons for the first time.  Plus, in an 
effort to demonstrate to the world that South Asians could be responsible nuclear powers 
the two nations had opened a dialogue, and in February 1999 they had celebrated the 
opening of the bus route that went from Lahore to Amritsar.  Although mostly symbolic, 
the event was intended to be a confidence building measure that would ease tensions 
between the two nations.  The Kargil operation derailed the rapprochement and raised the 
possibility that Pakistan was so obsessed with Kashmir that it was willing to trigger a war 
that could ultimately end with a nuclear exchange. 
The Kargil operation was not irrational or the product of an over zealous rogue 
agency.   In fact, the operation can be seen as an extension of Pakistan’s proxy war 
strategy.  Since the insurgency had lost momentum and in light of its numerous benefits, 
Pakistan sought a way to re-energize it.166  Furthermore, Pakistani strategist believed 
India’s escalation advantage had been negated.  Two reasons have  been proffered for this 
assessment.  First, the introduction of nuclear weapons led Pakistani strategist to 
conclude that India would not expand a conflict in Kashmir because it ran the risk of 
instigating a nuclear war.167  Second, Pakistan believed India would not conduct a full-
scale war against Pakistan because it could not guarantee victory and a stalemate would 
be a victory for Pakistan. 168  Whatever the reason, Pakistan’s strategist assessed the 
conflict would be relatively constrained.  Another factor that contributed to the decision 
to undertake the Kargil operation was that Pakistan saw the operation in the context of 
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the on-going India-Pakistan yearly competition to occupy territory along the LoC.169  The 
Indian army’s occupation of the Siachen glacier is the most blatant example of this 
activity.  But other exchanges of territory and positions had occurred frequently over the 
previous two decades.  The fourth factor contributing to the Kargil operation is that years 
of military autonomy in Kashmir created a situation in which neither its activities nor its 
judgments were subject to a sufficient amount of scrutiny by other Pakistani agencies.170 
 
2. Kargil’s Lessons  
Pakistan’s forced retreat from the heights of Kargil was an embarrassment for its 
military.  Nevertheless, a RAND study published in 2001 concluded that, despite the 
criticism of the operation, it is likely that Pakistan still believed that violence remained 
the best strategy to pressure India on Kashmir.  At the same time, the results of the Kargil 
operation “probably caused the Pakistani leadership to conclude that Kargil- like 
operations are not legitimate in the current international environment.”171  The reasons 
for this are two-fold.  First, Pakistan’s leaders still value their international reputation.  
Additionally, Pakistan understands that international, and particularly U.S., 
condemnation will entail severe economic and political consequences.172  Second, India’s 
willingness to escalate the conflict, especially the extensive use of air power, 
demonstrated that nuclear weapons were not necessarily the firewall against a wider war 
that Pakistani decision-makers had anticipated.173 
The response of India and the world, especially the United States, to the Kargil 
operation clarified the boundaries on Pakistan’s strategy.  In response to these conclusion, 
Pakistan’s re-calibrated its strategy but continued to support the proxy war. 
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3. The Impact of Post-11 September Changes 
The terrorist attacks on the United States altered the geopolitical environment in 
South Asia.  Three developments in particularly have already impacted Pakistan’s 
strategy in Kashmir.  First, Pakistan came to the realization that the use of militant 
proxies runs the  risk of jeopardizing higher priority national security interests.  Second, 
the U.S. declaration that regimes that harbor terrorists will be held responsible created an 
opportunity for India to try and halt Pakistan’s proxy war with the threat of escalation.  
Third, the renewal of the U.S.-Pakistan partnership provides Pakistan with incentives to 
restrain its strategy in Kashmir in exchange for the assistance and leverage the United 
States can provide it.   
One major geopolitical consequence of the terroris t attacks against the World 
Trade Center and the Pentagon was President Bush’s declaration on the evening of 11 
September 2001 that the United States “will make no distinction between the terrorists 
who committed these acts and those who harbor them.”174  Taliban intransigence in the 
face of Pakistan’s request for it to comply with the U.S. ultimatum to turn over Osama 
bin Laden demonstrated the limits of Pakistan’s influence over its once-client.  When the 
Taliban ignored Musharraf’s advice “to be wise,” he made it clear that Pakistan would 
not be sacrificed because of “stupidity.”  In President Musharraf’s nationally televised 
speech on 19 September 2001, in which he explained his decision to support the U.S. 
operation he stated that Pakistan’s “critical concerns are our sovereignty, second our 
economy, third our strategic assets (nuclear and missiles), and forth our Kashmir 
cause.”175  Musharraf’s elucidation of Pakistan’s core interests made it clear that 
Pakistan’s proxies would not be allowed to jeopardize these core interests. 
The U.S. decision to hold regimes that harbor terrorists accountable for the 
actions of those terrorists presented a dilemma for Pakistan’s proxy war strategy in 
Kashmir.  Despite its agreement to assist the United States in its war in Afghanistan, 
Pakistan planned to continue its proxy war in Kashmir.  It realized the precariousness of 
its position, though.   According to a source cited in a Department of Defense cable sent 
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on 2 October 2001, “Pakistani leaders are concerned that the U.S. will agree to India’s 
demands that Kashmir be treated as a global terrorism problem.”  The source continued, 
“Indian leaders are now feeling politically and military strong.  They are likely to exploit 
the situation by actively lobbying the international community over Kashmir. […] 
Pakistani leaders also expect that India might take some military action in Kashmir 
during the current crisis.”176  This concern caused Pakistani leaders to stress that the 
insurgents fighting in Kashmir were “freedom fighters” and not terrorists.   
Musharraf’s inclusion of the “Kashmir cause” as a core concern indicated that 
Pakistan was not willing to abandon its policy on Kashmir.  Nevertheless, aware of the 
volatility of the situation, Pakistan wanted to at least temporarily lower the profile of the 
insurgents activities in the hopes that it could continue its strategy after the charged 
atmosphere eased.  One militant group leader claimed, “All [the Pakistani authorities] 
told us to do was move our visible means of operation out of the spotlight.”177  Lashkar-
e-Toiba reportedly moved its offices out of Islamabad and took down its signs but 
continued to train its fighters there.178  As events unfolded in South Asia it became 
increasingly challenging for Pakistan to maintain the notion that the insurgents in 
Kashmir were freedom fighters and as a result its decade-old strategy came under 
pressure. 
Militants claiming to be fighting for Kashmir forced Pakistan to determine how 
much it was willing to put its sovereignty, economy, and strategic assets at risk to 
maintain the strategy it had used to pursue its “Kashmir cause.”  Less than two weeks 
after Musharraf’s speech to the nation on 19 September, militants assaulted the Jammu 
and Kashmir state assembly in Srinagar and left at least 27 people dead.  Then, on 13 
December 2001, five terrorists assaulted the Indian parliament in New Delhi and killed 
nine security personnel.  India reacted to the attack on its Parliament by recalling its High 
Commissioner of India to Pakistan, terminating air links, halting the bus service between 
Lahore and New Delhi, and mobilizing its military for war.  India also sent Deputy Prime 
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Minister L.K. Advani to Washington to convince the United States that the Kashmir 
insurgency should be consider part of the war on terror.  He met with President Bush and 
U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell and his message appeared to be get through to the 
United States.  At brief press conference, Powell stated that in addition to the Musharraf’s 
arrest of the leaders of the organizations India held responsible for the attack, “There is 
room for additional work on his part.”179  What exactly the United States discussed with 
Musharraf is unclear, but a report from the U.S. Congressional Research Service 
concluded, “The United States communicated to Pakistan that it would have to rein in 
Islamic extremist groups within its borders.”180   
India’s threat of war resulted in an intensification of pressure from the United 
States on Pakistan to not only end its support of the militants but to crack down on 
them.181  By designating the LeT and JeM foreign terrorist organizations, the United 
States made the continuation of Pakistan’s support for the organization equivalent to 
supporting terrorism.  Understanding the repercussions of being label a state-sponsor of 
terrorism and having already broke the two-decade alliance with the Islamists when he 
abandoned the Taliban, President Musharraf began to prepare his country for a shift in 
strategy.  On 12 January 2002, Musharraf told the Pakistani people: 
Kashmir runs in our blood.  No Pakistani can afford to 
sever links with Kashmir.  The entire Pakistan and the 
world knows this.  We will continue to extend our moral, 
political and diplomatic support to Kashmiris.  We will 
never budge an inch from our principle stand on Kashmir. 
[…] No organization will be allowed to indulge in 
terrorism in the name of Kashmir. […] Let there be no 
attempt of crossing the border in any sector as it will be met 
with full force.  Do not entertain any illusions on this 
count.182 
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Changes in the external environment made the continuation of a proxy war strategy too 
costly for Pakistan.  Nevertheless, Musharraf made it clear that Pakistan would not 
abandon its policy on Kashmir.  Musharraf repeated the Pakistani mantra that the 
Kashmir problem must be resolved “in accordance with the wishes of the Kashmiri 
people and the United Nations resolutions.”183   
When the terrorist attack in Jammu put India and Pakistan on the brink of war for 
the second time in May of that year, the pressure on Pakistan was intensified.  A flurry of 
diplomatic activity by the United States was able to get India to back down from its 
threats of “decisive war.”  “Key to the effort,” claims the CRS, “were promises by 
Pakistani President Musharraf to U.S. Deputy Secretary of State [Richard] Armitage that 
all infiltration of militants across the LOC would be halted.”184  Musharraf’s pledge to 
Armitage ignited a storm of protest from militants and their supports.  Sayed Salahuddin, 
head of the United Jihad Council, a militant umbrella organization, declared, “We are not 
bound to accept the decision Pakistan has made under international pressure.”185  
Protestors in Muzzaffarabad shouted, “Death to Musharraf,” and “We will not allow a 
weak ruler to sell out Kashmir.”186  
India’s response to the developments was cautious, but only two weeks after 
Armitage informed India of Musharraf’s pledge Vajpayee stated that if Pakistan ended 
terrorism from its soil, “India will be ready to have talks with Pakistan on all issues, 
including Jammu and Kashmir.”187  Continuing on the path toward dialogue and peace 
will depend on U.S. and Indian policies that reinforce Musharraf’s decision and provide 
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E. CONCLUSION 
The proxy war in Kashmir has resulted in an estimated 40,000 deaths, more than 
all of the wars waged between India and Pakistan combined.188  Pakistan’s motivations 
are important because they reveal what can be done to stop it.  The evidence presented 
above is encouraging because it shows that although militants have played a role in the 
insurgency, militancy does not drive Pakistan’s strategy.  In fact, political calculations 
typical within any government led to the military-Islamist coalition and the Pakistani 
government’s assessment that a proxy war would be an effective strategy.  The proxy war 
was not a rogue operation and had broad political support.  Moreover, it must be 
remember than in the early 1990s attitudes toward proxy war and the mujahedin were far 
different.  They were simply not considered the threat that they are today.  This applies to 
the United States as well, which had just finished its proxy war in Afghanistan in 
coordination with Pakistan. 
The importance of external factors in Pakistan’s shift in strategy should not be 
underestimated.  Without the indigenous Kashmir rebellion, it would have been highly 
unlikely that Pakistan would have initiated a proxy war in Kashmir.  Pakistan’s shift 
required an event that could provide it with some reason to believe it could change the 
situation in Kashmir.  Though deteriorating U.S.-Pakistan relations did not directly cause 
Pakistan to shift its strategy, they greatly reduced U.S. influence on Pakistan’s decision-
making.  When the Clinton Administration warned that Pakistan could be placed on the 
official list of states that support terrorism, Pakistan’s response was to simply reduce the 
most obvious indications that Pakistan was conducting a proxy war.  The strategy 
continued but was “privatized.”  Direct government support was lessened and Pakistan 
channeled its support indirectly through retired military personnel and Islamist parties.189 
The Pakistani operation in Kargil in 1999 is best understood as a part of the 
overall proxy war strategy and was an attempt to re-energize the insurgency that it 
believed had effectively advanced its objectives in Kashmir.  Although Pakistan may 
have misunderstood the significance of nuclear weapons, the Kargil operation was not 
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intended to set off the crisis that it subsequently did.  Kargil did reveal some significant 
problems with Pakistan’s decision-making processes but what is often overlooked is 
Pakistan’s decision to retreat from the area as a result of U.S. pressure and India’s 
reaction to the incursion.  Even though Nawaz Sharif’s decision was unpopular in some 
quarters, it was swiftly implemented and General Musharraf did not mention the Sharif’s 
decision as a reason for his dismissal. 
Finally, though militancy has risen in Pakistan during the last two decades, it does 
not drive Pakistan’s strategy.  Despite the military-Islamist alliance that had developed 
over two decades, the two groups have maintained vastly different concepts of Pakistan’s 
vital interests.  Musharraf’s elucidation of Pakistan’s “critical concerns” indicate that the 
military continues to see Pakistan’s interest through modern concepts of national interest.  
The Islamists’ fundamentalist interpretation of Islam see Pakistan’s interest in terms of its 
duty to wage jihad against infidels and the complete Islamization of Pakistan.  
Musharraf’s decision to support the U.S. in Afghanistan signifies the break in the 
military-Islamists alliance.  This fracture means that the constituency that supported 
proxy war is no longer a coherent block and lessens the internal pressures to wage proxy 
war. 
Pakistan strategy in Kashmir is driven by political calculations about what is 
possible and what is effective.  External factors, particularly the United States, have 
played a critical role in defining for Pakistan what exactly are possible and effective 
strategies.  With at least some degree of support from the United States, India has 
attempted to raise the cost of maintaining the proxy war strategy.   In conjunction with a 
renewed partnership with the United States, the increased cost of maintaining a proxy war 









The U.S. response to the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks was seized by India 
as the opportunity to press its case that the insurgency in Kashmir should be included as 
part of the global war against terrorism and therefore deserving of the same responses the 
United States is applying in its war against terrorism.  The attack against the Indian 
Parliament in December 2001 provided India the opportunity to press its case.  It 
mobilized its military and declared that it was prepared to attack terrorism at its source—
Pakistan.  The ensuing crisis sent the United States scrambling to avert war between the 
two nuclear neighbors in early 2002.  In May that year, a terrorist attack in Jammu put the 
two nations on the brink of war for the second time.  And again, the United States 
launched a high- intensity diplomatic effort to get the two countries to back down.  
Fortunately, U.S. efforts were successful and the tensions have cooled considerably since.  
In fact, the following April, Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee responded to President 
Musharraf’s commitment to halt all cross border terrorism by offering “a hand of 
friendship” to Pakistan.  In February 2004, the two nations began a process of bilateral 
“composite discussions” that has many observers uncharacteristically sanguine about the 
relationship’s prospects.  The problem is that Pakistan and India have been here before 
and yet the Kashmir dispute remains.  Is this time different?  The findings of this thesis 
are cautiously optimistic. 
 
B. FINDINGS 
The continuation of the domestic phenomenon driving Pakistan’s Kashmir policy 
indicate that it is unlikely Pakistan will substantially alter its claims to Kashmir in the 
near-term.  Although Musharraf has stated that he is willing to meet India “halfway” and 
put aside the U.N. Security Council Resolutions,190 that should not be interpreted as tacit 
acceptance of the LoC as the border.  Pakistan’s claim to Kashmir has survived fifty 
years, two failed military operations, civilian and military governments, economic and 
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military sanctions, and the threat of nuclear weapons.  Even when the threat of war 
loomed in January 2002, President Pervez Musharraf stated in unequivocal terms 
Pakistan’s policy on Kashmir: 
Kashmir runs in our blood.  No Pakistani can afford to 
sever links with Kashmir.  The entire world knows this.  
We will continue to extend our moral, political and 
diplomatic support to Kashmiris.  We will never budge an 
inch from our principle stand on Kashmir.  The Kashmir 
problem needs to be resolved by dialogue and peaceful 
means in accordance with the wishes of the Kashmiri 
people and the United Nations resolutions.  We have to find 
the solution to this dispute.191 
The psychological and political underpinnings that caused Pakistan to seek Kashmir’s 
accession at independence still exist.  Ethnic cleavages continue to be a divisive issue, 
institutions remain weak, and the last fifty years have mostly reinforced Pakistan’s beliefs 
about India’s hegemonic intentions.  The resilience of Pakistan’s policy demonstrates that 
changes in the external environment, even military defeat, did little to change this policy.  
Even though he acknowledges the need for flexibility, Musharraf continues to stress that 
“Kashmir and strategic assets are our national interests and we will not give them up […] 
There is no sell-out, I have said a hundred times, I am not a man to sell out.”192 
In contrast to Pakistan’s policy, its strategy has responded to external stimuli.  
Pakistan has used diplomacy, war, and proxy war to pursue its claim to Kashmir.  Each 
strategy was the product of both internal and external constraints or opportunities and 
were selected because they were considered to be the most effective way to pursue 
Pakistan’s objectives.  India’s conventional military advantage, its willingness to discuss 
Kashmir, and Pakistan’s reliance on the United States during the 1950s led it to use 
diplomacy until 1965 when each of these constraining factors had diminished.  Pakistan’s 
realization after 1971 that India held the upper hand in a conventional military conflict 
resulted in a shift back to diplomatic efforts that primarily focused on maintaining 
Kashmir’s designation as disputed territory.  The shift to a proxy war strategy was 
possible because a constituency had developed in Pakistan that supported insurgency and 
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the eruption of the Kashmiri rebellion gave Pakistan reason to believe that it would be 
effective.  The analysis in this thesis indicates that if Pakistan assesses the strategy is no 
longer effective, it can be discarded.   
The United States has played a key role in Pakistan’s strategy shifts.  Pakistan’s 
decision to go to war in 1965 was heavily influenced by its perception that the United 
States had shifted its allegiances to India in the 1960s.  This shift, Pakistan believed, 
would strengthen India thus allowing it to disregard Pakistan’s claims to Kashmir.  
Additionally, the 1950s and the 1980s are the periods of time in which the U.S.-Pakistan 
relationship were the most cooperative and are the same periods that Pakistan’s leaders 
most actively used diplomacy to seek a resolution to the Kashmir dispute.  Although it is 
difficult to know exactly how much U.S. sanctions influenced Pakistan’s decision to 
launch its proxy war, its importance should not be discounted.   
Despite the rise in militancy in Pakistan during the last two decades, Pakistan’s 
leaders remain committed to the modernization and development of Pakistan.  Pakistan’s 
military, which has throughout Pakistan’s history played a disproportionate role in 
Pakistan’s affairs, continues to be a major force for modernization and economic 
development and it is particularly committed to a strong relationship with the United 
States.  The Pakistan army may not be the secular, aloof, “British Generation” of its early 
decades,193 but as an institution it continues to value Pakistan’s international reputation 
and seeks to modernize Pakistan.  In General Musharraf’s speech on 17 October 1999, in 
which he attempted to explain his reasons for removing Prime Minister Sharif and also 
ease the concerns of the international community, he asked rhetorically, “In sum, we have 
lost our honor, our dignity, our respect in the comity of nations.  Is this the democracy 
our Quaid-i-Azam [Jinnah] had envisaged?”  He stressed throughout the speech, “Revival 
of our economy is critical.”  As for Pakistan’s relationship with the United States, 
Musharraf stated, “We attach the highest importance to our friendly relations with all 
major powers, especially the United States.”194 
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The manner in which Kashmir’s accession was obtained, the belief that India’s 
control over Kashmir was intended to weaken Pakistan so that it could not survive, and 
India’s invasion of East Pakistan have all reinforced Pakistan’s mistrust of India.  If those 
are the underlying reasons for Pakistan’s policy, then changing it will require, at a 
minimum, a change in Pakistani beliefs about India and a change in Pakistanis 
understanding of what Kashmir means to their nation.  These are changes that will 
require years, and if Pakistan continues to support a proxy war they are changes tha t will 
not come.  Therefore, the first task should be to focus on ending the proxy war. 
President Musharraf indicated in his first major address to the nation after 
assuming power in October 1999 that he saw the rise of militant Islam as a threat to 
Pakistan.  He stated, “Islam teaches tolerance, not hatred, universal brotherhood and not 
enmity, peace not violence, progress not bigotry.”  He also urged the ulema “to curb 
elements which are exploiting religion for vested interests and bringing bad name to our 
faith.”195  When he pitched his plan to rehabilitate Pakistan’s reputation and economy by 
eliminating militancy and violence to an annual conference of Pakistan’s top clerics in 
June 2001, he informed them that the world “looks upon us as terrorists.”  He explained, 
“We have been killing each other, and now we want to spread violence and terror abroad.  
Naturally, the world regards us as terrorists.”196  In August that year, the Pakistani 
government made its first strike against militant Islamist organizations when it banned 
the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and Sipah-e-Muhammad.  The events of 11 September 2001 
appear to have accelerated Musharraf’s plan to rein in the Islamist organizations, 
however, until that point there was no discussion of changing strategies in Kashmir.  
India’s bid to utilize the atmosphere created by the U.S. war on terror forced Pakistan to 
re-assess the costs and benefits of maintaining its proxy war strategy. 
Prior to the crisis in January 2002, Pakistan realized the rising violence, weapons 
smuggling, and growing militancy posed a threat to the nation.  Sartaj Aziz, a former 
Pakistani foreign and finance minister, observed, “For every ten [militants] who are 
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trained here to fight in Kashmir, one goes and the rest stay in Pakistan to cause 
trouble.”197 But the assault on India’s Parliament demonstrated that unpredictable 
militants proxies presented a greater risk to Pakistan beyond the danger of fomenting 
internal instability.  The proxy war strategy was useful because it was a weapon that 
Pakistan believed it controlled.  The Taliban’s obstinacy in the face of U.S. demands and 
the series of militant attacks against India indicated that any Pakistani notion of control 
was illusory.  In late 2001, Retired Pakistani Lieutenant General Talat Masood 
acknowledged that Pakistan was going to have to make adjustments in its Kashmir 
strategy:  “Thanks to the U.S. antiterrorism campaign, the mujahideen fighting in 
Kashmir will have to be reined in.  The state has to have a monopoly of armed force.  
Above all, our possession of nuclear weapons makes this essential, because there is 
internal instability here, there will be attempts at intense international scrutiny of us.”198   
Musharraf’s decision to rein in the proxy war won him the enmity of the militants 
and their supporters.  Retired Lieutenant General Hamid Gul, the former head of ISI, 
criticized Musharraf for “only echoing India’s position” by calling those who attacked 
India’s Parliament terrorists during his 12 January 2002 speech. 199  Since the speech, 
rumors have swirled about Musharraf’s ability to withstand the militant backlash.  
However, he has endured the criticism of the Islamist organizations as well as two failed 
assassination attempts in December 2003.  Moreover, despite speculation, there has been 
no evidence that the military brass is opposed to the shift and is plotting a coup to unseat 
Musharraf. 
Throughout his tenure, Musharraf’s administration has continued to focus on the 
rehabilitation of Pakistan’s reputation, its economy, and its relationship with the United 
States.  His score on the economy has been positive and his decision to abandon the 
Taliban in the face of U.S. pressure restored Pakistan’s status as a U.S. ally.  It has been 
more difficult for Musharraf to restore Pakistan’s international reputation because of the 
proxy war in Kashmir and the recent revelations by Abdul Qadeer Khan that he was 
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surreptitiously selling nuclear technology to Iran, North Korea, and Libya.  However, 
despite knowing that cracking down on Khan, a national hero in Pakistan, would bring 
public anger, Musharraf decided it was necessary to assuage U.S. and international 
concerns.  It appears that Musharraf’s is convinced that the costs of maintaining a proxy 
war in Kashmir now outweigh its benefits.  The United States has a crucial part in 
ensuring that Pakistan remains committed to that assessment. 
Pakistan’s leaders recognize that their current favorable standing with the United 
States is largely due to the U.S. war on terror and Pakistan’s willingness to assist in that 
war.  Prior U.S.-Pakistan partnerships have been forged in response to common threats 
and when these threats receded, so did the usefulness of the relationship.  This pattern has 
led to a perception on Pakistan’s part that the United States has been a fickle friend.  It 
remains concerned over what the United States will do when bin Laden is caught and the 
war on terror’s urgency eases.200  Will U.S. assistance last beyond the capture of Osama 
bin Laden?  Will sanctions be renewed against Pakistan for its nuclear program?   
Although the United States should not expect Pakistan to shift its policy on 
Kashmir, it should continue its effort to persuade Pakistan to shift away from proxy war.  
In order to do this, a two-pronged strategy is necessary.  First, the United States should 
establish a partnership with Pakistan that is grounded in the understanding that Pakistan’s 
future is a national security interest of the United States.  Pakistan’s economic, political, 
and institutional development is in the interest of the United States.  The U.S.-Pakistan 
relationship must be rooted in this belief.  Pakistan still values and seeks a strong 
relationship with the United States.  The United States should use this influence and 
establish a commitment to Pakistan tha t goes “beyond bin Laden.”201  The Bush 
administration is on the right track. Its agreement to provide a three billion dollar aid 
package over five years indicates a serious long-term U.S. commitment to Pakistan’s 
development. 
With a framework for a long-term U.S.-Pakistan commitment established, 
Pakistan must understand that with commitment comes responsibilities.  Although the 
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United States and Pakistan cooperated in a proxy war against the Soviets in Afghanistan, 
the use of militant proxies has had negative repercussions for both the United States and 
Pakistan.  Pakistan must understand that its national interests are jeopardized as a result 
of this proxy war strategy and it must end.  The United States should continue to quietly 
press Pakistan to maintain its crackdown on militants within its borders.  Beyond the 
economic and societal costs of the strategy, the introduction of nuclear weapons has made 
the frequent crisis instigated by the insurgency extremely dangerous. 
Finally, India has a critical role in Pakistan’s continued shift away from proxy 
war.  India should maintain its position that it will no longer tolerate a proxy war strategy, 
but it also should provide Pakistan with incentives to pursue a peaceful strategy.  Its 
agreement to discuss all bilateral issues, including Kashmir, in the composite dialogue 
meetings is an important first step toward India’s acknowledgment that Kashmir is a 
political problem and that refusing to address the dispute with Pakistan over the last fifty 
years has failed to solve it.  India’s willingness to discuss the issue and the initiation of a 
process that facilitates confidence-building should provide Pakistan’s leaders with the 
necessary political capital to maintain this shift away from proxy war and to continue the 
peace process. 
Pakistan’s Foreign Secretary Riaz Khokhar claimed after the talks in February 
2004, “There is a realization on both sides that war is not an option.”202  Although it is a 
good first step, the road ahead is arduous.  While the two nations may agree that their 
approach to the issue must change, creating the necessary flexibility in their respective 
policies is likely to take years.  Kashmir is a political question loaded with national 
identity and sovereignty implications for India and Pakistan that make it far more 
important and complicated than simply a territorial dispute.  Reaching a solution that 
accounts for these complexities will require years of confidence building measures and 
internal political changes, but a solution will not be reached with the continuation of the 
proxy war.  The United States should not attempt to mediate the dispute.  However, it 
should continue to stay actively involved and stress the costs the Kashmir dispute has on 
both countries and help the leaders of India and Pakistan fend off demands from hard-
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liners in their  countries that advocate a more violent strategy to settle the dispute.  Present 
circumstances have bought President Musharraf some time to make bold moves with 
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